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A PARENT IS A PARENT, NO MATTER HOW SMALL
KENDRA HUARD FERSHEE*
ABSTRACT
Every parent in America has constitutional rights to parent his
or her children. If a parent is under the age of eighteen, however,
those rights are tenuous. There is no question that adolescent parents
face difficulties while trying to juggle school, parental responsibilities,
work, their social lives, and more. Add to that long list of challenges
the legal infirmities all minors share, and a picture of impending di-
saster begins to appear for the adolescent parent and his or her child.
Furthermore, once a minor parent enters the family court system—
instead of getting the services, training, and supervision that may
be needed to help him or her adjust to, and take responsibility for, the
difficulties of parenthood—he or she may be at risk of losing his or
her child.
The struggles adolescent parents encounter do not necessarily
indicate they are bad parents. Of course, some adolescent parents,
like some adult parents, are simply bad parents who should not re-
tain their parental rights. Yet, the legal and life hurdles adolescent
parents encounter should be considered by courts when an adolescent
parent’s parental rights are being questioned. If courts were sensitive
to the fact that the parent whose parenting is in question is an adoles-
cent and that adolescent parents are legally and societally impeded
from upholding their parental responsibilities, they would be less
likely to invade adolescent parents’ fundamental rights to raise their
children. One way to help courts be sensitive to the issues adolescent
parents face would be for states to add a factor to their “best interests
of the child” test encouraging courts to proceed with caution when
considering the fitness and custodial rights of adolescent parents.
This article argues that the constitutional rights of parents to
raise their children require that courts take extreme care during
dependency hearings that involve adolescent parents to ensure that
those constitutional rights are protected. First, adolescent parents
are not as legally equipped to engage fully in their rights and respon-
sibilities as adult parents. Second, adolescent parents often lack, for
a number of reasons outside their control, the skills it takes to be a
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good parent, but they are not necessarily incapable of learning those
skills once taught. Third, adolescent parents are not in a position of
power that allows them to advocate effectively for themselves or
their children during the dependency process. When a group of people
is so vulnerable and when its rights are so important, states and
courts should do all they can to ensure that it is treated fairly. This
article not only points out the potential pitfalls for courts when han-
dling dependency proceedings involving adolescent parents, it also
endeavors to suggest solutions to those problems.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PARENT
II. SKEPTICISM ABOUT ADOLESCENTS’ ABILITY TO PARENT,
THE REALITY OF ADOLESCENT PARENTING, AND THE
PIG-PEN PHENOMENON
A. What Studies Say About Adolescent Parenting
1. Adolescent Parents Are Negatively Impacted by
Childbearing in Adolescence
2. Children May Suffer Many Harmful Effects from
Being Born to Young Parents
3. Effects Are Felt by Society
B. Adolescents Do Not Enjoy the Same Legal Rights as Adults
1. The Supreme Court’s Take on Adolescence and the
Law—Inside and Outside the Context of Parenthood
2. Statutory and Common Law Restrictions on
Adolescents’ Rights
III. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS: ADJUDICATION OF A PARENT’S
FITNESS AND DISPOSITION OF CUSTODY
A. Determining Fitness of Adolescent Parents: Adjudication
B. Determining the Best Interests of the Child: Disposition
IV. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRES THAT JUDGES BE
CAREFUL TO SEPARATE THE IMPEDIMENTS OF ADOLESCENCE
FROM THE PARENTAL FITNESS ANALYSIS DURING THE
ADJUDICATION PHASE TO AVOID TRAMPLING THEIR
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN
V. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE REQUIRES THAT JUDGES
CONSIDER THE YOUTH OF ADOLESCENT PARENTS DURING THE
DISPOSITION PHASE TO AVOID HOLDING THEM TO STANDARDS
TO WHICH ADULT PARENTS ARE NOT SUBJECT
A. Adolescent Parents Enjoy a Liberty Interest in Raising
Their Children That Is Supported by the Equal
Protection Clause
2012] A PARENT IS A PARENT 427
B. Incorporating a New Best Interests Factor That
Encourages Judges to Support, Not Punish,
Adolescent Parents for Their Youth Would Help
Judges Apply the Laws Equally
1. Best Interests Tests Are Intended to Protect
Children from Harm, While Preserving the
Family Unit When Possible
2. Do Not Account for Age Positively or Negatively
C. Tests Should Include a Factor That Seeks to Support




Once a person becomes a parent in the United States, he or she
has a constitutional right to parent his or her child.1 Without some
intervening reason to get involved, neither states nor the federal gov-
ernment statutorily disfavor the rights of parents to parent, despite
the parent’s age, health, mental capacity, education level, and so on.2
This reluctance to intervene with the family unit is rooted in the legal
system’s treatment of parental rights as fundamental rights and its
recognition that the process through which parental rights can be
terminated is subject to Due Process constraints as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 Once the State has reason to examine a
parent/child relationship, perhaps because of allegations of abuse or
neglect, or because of a custody battle, those fundamental rights may
be subject to an examination of the fitness of the parent.4 That fitness
1. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter.” (internal citation omitted)).
2. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“[R]ights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State.”).
3. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he ‘liberty’ protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the right of parents to ‘establish a home and bring up children’ and
‘to control the education of their own.’ ” (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401
(1923))); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982) (“[S]tate intervention to termi-
nate the relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by proce-
dures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.” (alterations in original) (quoting
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981))).
4. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (“[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their
natural relationship.”). “After the State has established parental unfitness at that initial
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analysis cannot, constitutionally, and should not, morally, include any
consideration of the age of the parent, but instead should focus on
specific factual evidence regarding the parent’s ability to bond with
the child, to provide for and discipline the child appropriately, and to
direct and control his or her upbringing properly.
Once a parent has been declared unfit during the adjudication
phase of a custody determination, the court will conduct a “best inter-
ests of the child” inquiry to determine who should have custody over
the child or children of the unfit parent in the disposition phase.5 The
test is meant to balance the rights of parents to parent their children
and the interests of the state in protecting children from harm.6 The
test varies from state to state, but there are some common threads.7
Many states explicitly state overarching goals and principles for courts
to uphold when making custody determinations, such as a preference
to avoid removing children from their family homes or to maintain
“[t]he health, safety, and/or protection of the child.”8 Like the guid-
ing principles, the factors that states use to determine a custodial
arrangement that is in the best interests of the child are frequently
similar to one another as well.9
The factors states rely on to determine custody are linked to the
ability of the parents to provide a safe and stable environment for
their children. For example, many states consider the emotional ties
between the parents and the child, as well as the mental and physical
health needs of the parents and children.10 Other common threads
in the best interests factors include the parent’s ability to provide
“adequate food, clothing, and medical care,” as well as a determination
of whether domestic violence is present in the home.11 Many states
employ a broad and general statement that gives courts more discre-
tion in the best interests analysis.12 Only three states include factors
that cannot be considered—expressly requiring courts to disregard
proceeding, the court may assume as the dispositional stage that the interests of the child
and the natural parents do diverge.” Id.
5. Id.
6. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest
.pdf (listing the goals underlying the “best interests of the child” standard).
7. See id. (“ ‘Best interests’ determinations are generally made by considering a
number of factors related to the circumstances of the child and the circumstances and
capacity of the child’s potential caregiver(s), with the child’s ultimate safety and well-
being as the paramount concern.”).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 6, at 4.
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socioeconomic status, gender, or disability in their analysis13—and
no states explicitly bar courts from taking into account the age of the
parent when determining custody.
The tests are meant to be flexible in order to allow for courts to
consider the complexities inherent in parent/child relationships when
deciding whether a parent who may have been adjudicated unfit
should have contact with his or her children,14 but they do little to
alert courts to the pitfalls in examining the fitness of an adolescent
parent. Because adolescent parents, by definition, are parenting dur-
ing their adolescence, their parenting abilities are greeted, by society
and the courts, with a hefty dose of skepticism.15 This skepticism of
an adolescent16 parent’s ability to parent can easily seep into the
court’s reasoning when it adjudicates whether a parent is fit to parent,
which is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.17
In addition, courts cannot treat adolescent parents’ right to parent
differently than adult parents under the Equal Protection Clause by
considering the age of the parent as a negative factor in the best
interests of the child balancing test.18 As such, states should expand
their considerations of parental fitness and the factors in their best
interests of the child tests in an attempt to be supportive of adolescent
parents in their roles as parents, so that courts do not—purposely
or inadvertently—unconstitutionally hold the adolescent parent’s ado-
lescence against him or her in the fact finding or disposition stages
of custody determinations.
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PARENT
Although the concept that parents have a fundamental right to
raise their children how they see fit—within reason—has not pervaded
the entire history of the United States, it is one of the first fundamen-
tal liberties the Court recognized.19 In 1923, the Court determined
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains
within it a substantive fundamental right of parents to parent their
13. Id. at 3–4.
14. See id. at 2.
15. See, e.g., McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 680–81, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (“The
risk that the adolescent mother will not be competent to rear her child, and will be unable
to realize on her native endowments but will rather be stunted in her development and
remain unable to function adequately in employment or home management is pitiably
great.”), rev’d, sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
16. Throughout this article, I use “adolescent” to modify parent, which I define as a
parent under the age of eighteen. I use the word minor to modify child when I refer to
the children born to parents under the age of eighteen.
17. See infra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
19. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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children.20 A parent’s interest is paramount over other interests,
such as the State’s interest in educating children or a grandparent’s
interest in visiting a grandchild.21 Since Meyer v. Nebraska, the
Court has consistently rejected attempts to interfere with that lib-
erty interest and steadfastly protected parents’ rights to direct and
control the upbringing of their children.22 In no case has the Supreme
Court limited that fundamental liberty interest to parents who have
reached the age of majority.23
In addition, the right to parent is protected by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 In Stanley v. Illinois, the
Court broadly stated that “[t]he integrity of the family unit has found
protection in . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 25 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court, considering a
law that allowed habitual offenders of certain types of crime to be
sterilized against their will, stated that “[m]arriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” 26
The rights of an individual to start a family as well as to maintain the
family unit are rights that those living in the United States share
equally, unless and until there is proof through a constitutionally
sound process that those rights should be infringed.27 As such, the
laws that apply to adolescent parents in the disposition phase of a
dependency hearing28 must be applied in the same way that they are
applied to adults in dependency hearings.29
20. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [the liberty interest]
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to . . .
establish a home and bring up children . . . .”).
21. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73 (holding that a state statute requiring any per-
son who sues for visitation rights to children be granted those rights if visitation is in the
best interests of the child is an unconstitutional infringement on a parent’s fundamental
right to parent); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that a
statute requiring that children attend public schools violated parents’ rights “to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control”).
22. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (enumerating several Supreme Court cases where the
fundamental liberty interest to parent has been upheld and reiterating that the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly protects that interest).
23. See Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 787 & n.6
(2000) (noting the Court has yet to rule on the issue of curtailing a minor parental rights).
24. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942).
25. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (internal citations omitted).
26. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
27. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 173 (1944) (“[T]he human freedoms . . .
carried over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed invulnerable and any
attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima facie invalid. It follows that any re-
striction or prohibition must be justified by those who deny that the freedoms have been
unlawfully invaded.”).
28. See infra Part III.B (discussing the disposition phase of dependency hearings).
29. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding that
the denial of a building permit to a home for the mentally disabled was a violation of the
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Adolescents have the same fundamental constitutional right to
parent as anyone else. There is no Supreme Court precedent, nor state
law, that curtails the right of an adolescent to parent his or her child.30
To speculate why no state has attempted to interfere statutorily with
an adolescent’s right to parent is difficult; there are many possible
reasons states have not done so. On the one hand, it might be odd
to think that states would pass laws to strip adolescents of some of
their parental rights because the Court has been so clear about the
fundamental nature of the right to parent.31 On the other hand, it
is also odd that states have not seen fit to insert themselves more
formally into adolescents’ parent-child relationships, because states
are so quick to regulate so many other aspects of adolescents’ lives.32
No matter how young a parent is, it is difficult to imagine that,
in a free society, a state should or could proactively interfere with
a parent’s fundamental right to parent by enacting a law that termi-
nates parental rights if the parent is under a certain age.33 One can
imagine futuristic doomsday novels and movies where such a law has
been passed, replete with scenes of heart-wrenching forced adoptions
or abortions, or images of a pregnant teenager running away to a dis-
tant country where she could raise her child without fear of state in-
terference. Certainly, that states would even consider such an extreme
option would be thought by many to be outrageous. The fact that
states have not legally forbidden young people from becoming par-
ents, however, did not deter society from socially condemning legions
of girls over the course of many decades simply because they were
pregnant.34 The era when adolescent women who became pregnant
were given no choice by society but to get married or give up their
children for adoption deeply harmed those women emotionally and
mentally for the duration of their lives; this must not be repeated.35
Equal Protection Clause as applied because there was no rational reason for the city to
believe that the home would pose a threat to the city’s legitimate interests).
30. See Buss, supra note 23, at 787 & n.6.
31. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (“The established doc-
trine is that this liberty may not be interfered with . . . without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”).
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See Buss, supra note 23, at 812–14, 822 (observing that compelling an adolescent
parent to take certain actions with respect to his or her child is disfavored).
34. See ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE
V. WADE 71–72 (2006) (“Those young women were made to suffer a latter-day version of
social shunning.”).
35. See id. at 207–11 (“Their grief has been exacerbated, and in some cases become
chronic, because they were not permitted to talk about or properly grieve their loss. Not
only was the surrender of their child not recognized as a loss; the implication was they
should be grateful that others had taken care of their problem.”).
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Not only have states been unwilling to legally bar adolescents
from becoming parents, they have also been loath to codify any in-
terference with an adolescent parent’s right to parent.36 States have
not granted the parents of the adolescent parent a formal right to
have a say in whether the adolescent parent should become a parent
or to have a legally recognized role in the adolescent parent-child
relationship.37 Nor have states required any sort of parenting train-
ing or licensure of adolescent parents.38 This state reticence to a statu-
torily mandated state or third-party involvement in the adolescent
parent-child relationship should not be taken, however, as an indi-
cation that states or society trust that adolescent parents are good
parents. In fact, deep skepticism that adolescent parents can ade-
quately care and provide for their children abounds,39 creating a
situation that may result in courts unconstitutionally terminating
parental rights of adolescents without cause.
II. SKEPTICISM ABOUT ADOLESCENTS’ ABILITY TO PARENT,
THE REALITY OF ADOLESCENT PARENTING, AND THE
PIG-PEN PHENOMENON
It would be difficult to argue that there is a generally held belief
that adolescents make good parents or that society benefits when
adolescents become parents.40 If asked, most people would likely say
that they think it is better for a person to wait until adulthood to be-
come a parent. That adolescents are believed to be less equipped than
adults to handle many aspects of the basic functions of life cannot
be disputed.41 Courts, legislatures, and agencies have long restricted
(often characterized as “protected”) adolescents from entering into
36. See Buss, supra note 23, at 786 (“[I]f she chooses to keep the baby, the law gives
her carte blanche, despite the harm that may come to her, to her baby, to her parents, and
to society as a result.”).
37. Id. at 805–08.
From the moment the minor becomes a parent, lines of authority are pro-
foundly affected for the remainder of that minor’s childhood: While the
adult parents still have custodial authority over their child, they have little
authority over the most important aspect of her conduct—how she behaves
as a parent—and no direct authority over their child’s child.
Id. at 808 (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 820–21.
39. See id. at 788–90 (“Becoming a parent before becoming an adult is widely perceived
as a bad outcome in our society.” (footnote omitted)).
40. See Rebecca A. Maynard, The Study, the Context, and the Findings in Brief, in KIDS
HAVING KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TEEN PREGNANCY 1, 2–4
(Rebecca A. Maynard ed., 1997) [hereinafter KIDS HAVING KIDS] (describing the many
consequences of adolescent childbearing).
41. See Buss, supra note 23, at 786 (noting minors’ “special vulnerability” and “limited
decision making capacity”).
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contracts, making life and death decisions, directing their own educa-
tions, exercising their right to free speech, and more.42 Although these
formal restrictions have not explicitly been applied by legislatures
to the parental rights of adolescents, the courts, when determining
fitness, may overly rely on this skepticism to limit the fundamental
rights of adolescent parents to parent without first taking simple
steps to help adolescent parents succeed as parents.43
Even though studies have shown that adolescent parents may be
more at risk to struggle in their roles as parents and that adolescent
parents are impeded by law from doing many of the things that par-
ents need to do to support their children, there are few mechanisms
in place to support adolescent parents.44 Despite the massive number
of dollars pumped into fighting teen pregnancy each year, there are
essentially no dollars dedicated to helping adolescent parents be better
parents.45 Once an adolescent becomes pregnant, she slips into obliv-
ion, unless and until her fitness as a parent is called into question.
At that point, she is generally thrust into the family court system,
where her fitness as a parent is evaluated.46 While it is possible an
adolescent parent could receive support and assistance from the court
system to help her become a better parent, the focus is generally on
the wrongs she has committed as a parent, not the remedies that
could foster a positive and healthy parent-child relationship.47
There is plenty of data indicating that adolescent parenting is
fraught with difficulty for the adolescent parent and the children of
42. See Sarah Katz, When the Child Is a Parent: Effective Advocacy for Teen Parents
in the Child Welfare System, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 544–48 (2006).
43. See id. at 554 (“Courts, advocates, and social service providers often assume that
the teenager is a per se unfit parent or may bypass the teenager’s parental rights simply
because of her youth.”).
44. See id. at 536 (“Considering the[ ] poor outcomes for ‘alumni’ of the foster care and
juvenile justice systems and their children, it is particularly shocking that our child welfare
system is so ill prepared to address the needs of young parents.”).
45. There are multitudes of federally and state funded programs dedicated to prevent-
ing adolescent pregnancy. One program, the federal Personal Responsibility Education
Program (PREP), which provides young people with information about teen pregnancy
and sexually transmitted disease prevention, as well as information about preparing for
adulthood, doled out over 45 million dollars to states in 2010. See FY 2010 Personal
Responsibility Education Program (PREP) Grantees, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, U.S.
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb /content
/docs/10_prep.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2011). In addition to PREP funds, states re-
ceived more than 33 million dollars in abstinence program funding in 2010. FY 2010
Abstinence Program Grantees, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH
& HUM. SERVICES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/content/docs/10_titlev.htm (last
updated Mar. 14, 2011).
46. See infra Part III (describing the adjudication/disposition process).
47. See infra Part III (discussing the adolescent parent’s experience in the adjudication/
disposition process).
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adolescent parents. Data in the 1970s and 1980s seemed to show
that becoming a parent during adolescence would lead to multiple
negative outcomes for the parent, such as poverty, lower educational
attainment, difficulty finding and keeping a job, over-reliance on gov-
ernmental assistance, and more.48 Similarly, there are studies that
suggest that the well-being of children born to young parents is at risk
because of the adolescence of the parent.49 More recent competing
studies, however, have found that many of the struggles encountered
by adolescent parents and their children may not be caused by the fact
that the adolescent became a parent during his or her youth, but are
simply correlative.50 Most studies on the topic, however, abound with
data that adolescent parents do struggle in life, as do their children.51
Although researchers might disagree on whether adolescent par-
enting is the cause of many struggles that young parents and their
children encounter in life, basically every study conducted about ado-
lescent parenting indicates that life is hard for young parents and
their children.52 It appears, based on the more recent studies, that
life was hard for many adolescent parents before they had children
and that life probably would have been hard for their children, regard-
less of how old their parents were when they were born.53 What is
important about the studies, both the ones that suggest adolescent
parenting causes negative life outcomes and those that suggest a
simple correlation between the two, is that they connect adolescent
parenting with a host of troubles for the adolescent parents and their
48. See, e.g., 1 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXU-
ALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING 123–34 (Cheryl D. Hayes ed., 1987) (describing the
possible negative outcomes for adolescent parents).
49. See, e.g., id. at 134–39 (describing the negative outcomes for children of adoles-
cent parents); Judith A. Levine et al., The Well-Being of Children Born to Teen Mothers,
69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 105, 105–06 (2007) (discussing studies that find a causal link
between adolescent parenting and the poor well-being of children born to adolescents).
50. See, e.g., Arline T. Geronimus & Sanders Korenman, The Socioeconomic Con-
sequences of Teen Childbearing Reconsidered, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1187, 1208 (1992) (report-
ing the results of a study regarding the socioeconomic status of young parents while
controlling for family background and finding that earlier studies linking teenaged par-
enthood with long-term lower socioeconomic status might be “overstat[ing] the costs of
teen childbearing”).
51. See, e.g., Levine et al., supra note 49, at 105–06 (reporting results of several studies
linking adolescent parenting to negative outcomes); Greg Pogarsky et al., Developmental
Outcomes for Children of Young Mothers, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 332, 340 (2006) (finding
that boys born to adolescent mothers were more likely to use drugs, be involved in gangs,
and be unemployed, and that all children born of adolescent mothers were likely to them-
selves becomes parents at an early age); David M. Stier et al., Are Children Born to Young
Mothers at Increased Risk of Maltreatment?, 91 PEDIATRICS 642, 646 (1993) (finding a
correlation between adolescent parenting and maltreatment of their young children).
52. See, e.g., Levine et al., supra note 49, at 121 (“[T]een pregnancy is correlated with
poor outcomes . . . .”).
53. See Geronimus & Korenman, supra note 50, at 1208–09.
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children.54 Those troubles seem to stick to most adolescent parents
and their children, creating what I will call the “Pig-Pen Phenomenon.”
The Pig-Pen Phenomenon is based on the lovably messy Peanuts char-
acter whose cloud of dust follows him wherever he goes.55
Much like Pig-Pen, adolescent parents carry with them a burden
that they cannot shed easily. In Pig-Pen’s case, he cannot rid himself
of the cloud of dust that can interfere with his attempts to catch the
attention of a girl with whom he has become smitten.56 In a teen
parent’s case, she cannot rid herself of several obstacles to her pa-
rental success that are largely based on her age and have little to do
with her ability to be a good parent. Having a baby requires a student
to find daycare so she can work and go to school, which is expensive
and hard to come by for many adults, particularly those who fall below
the poverty threshold.57 A teen parent has the same parental respon-
sibilities as any other parent, but she is not legally capable of making
decisions in the same way an adult is.58 A teen parent has significant
financial obligations, but less earning potential than adult parents.59
While the Pig-Pen Phenomenon likely would have the strongest effect
on underprivileged adolescent parents—which, not coincidentally,
make up the majority of teen parents according to many studies60—
it can affect all teen parents.
54. See infra Part II.A.
55. Pig-Pen, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pig-Pen (last visited Mar. 30,
2012). Charles Schulz’s Peanuts comic strip and television programs created a series of
lovable, yet humanly imperfect, characters with whom many young people, and adults,
can identify. Pig-Pen does not seem to do anything to cause himself to get dirty, but the
dirt seems to be magnetically attracted to him. Id.
56. Id.
57. In 2006–2007, the National Center for Education Statistics reported that 40.9
percent of pre-primary-aged children from ages three to five in families below the pov-
erty threshold attended some sort of center-based child care program, while 59.6 percent
of non-poor children in the same age group attended. Table 1. Percentage of Preprimary
Children Ages 3–5 Who Were Enrolled in Center-Based Early Childhood Care and
Education Programs, by Poverty Status and Race Ethnicity: 2006–07, NAT’L CENTER FOR
EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008051_a.asp (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012). While some adolescent parents may have a built-in support system
with family members who are willing to watch their children while they work or attend
school, not all do, and the availability of child care is crucial to the educational success of
an adolescent parent. See Stefanie Mollborn, Making the Best of a Bad Situation: Material
Resources and Teenage Parenthood, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 92, 93 (2007) (recognizing that
having material resources is important to an adolescent parent’s success and noting that
“for most teenage parents, these high resource demands are not being met, either by them-
selves or by others” (citation omitted)).
58. See infra Part II.B (discussing the added struggle of adolescent parents because of
their status as minors under the law).
59. See Mollborn, supra note 57, at 93.
60. See, e.g., Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Effects on the Children Born to Adolescent
Mothers, in KIDS HAVING KIDS, supra note 40, at 145, 170 (“Young teen mothers . . . were
more often recipients of welfare at some point during their own childhoods.”).
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Despite all of the clear data showing that many adolescent par-
ents struggle in their efforts to provide support to their children and
that children of adolescent parents are likely to struggle throughout
childhood and into adulthood,61 once in the court system, an adoles-
cent parent’s minority could be used against her in the fitness and
custody determinations.62 Instead of being considered a mitigating
factor that could be viewed as a logical and reasonable explanation for
her struggle to provide for her child, an adolescent parent’s youth
might be considered a reason to declare her unfit as a parent or to cut
off her custodial rights.63 Instead of evaluating the legal hurdles she
may have encountered in her daily life, which may impede her ability
to parent effectively, she is treated as a social ill that needs to be cor-
rected by removing her child from her custody.64 Being a parent is
never easy; the responsibilities of parenthood are daunting no matter
when a person becomes a parent.65 Adolescent parents face all of the
regular challenges presented by parenthood, and, with the added pres-
sure of societal and legal limitations they experience, they can find
themselves involved in dependency proceedings over their ability to
care for their children.66
A. What Studies Say About Adolescent Parenting
As stated above, the Pig-Pen Phenomenon affects almost all ado-
lescent parents in some way. Without looking at a single study or
newspaper headline, most people would agree that adolescent par-
enting is associated with difficulties in life for the adolescent parent,
the child born to the young parent, and society. It is essentially undis-
puted that adolescent parenting comes with educational, financial,
61. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 123–39.
62. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 42, at 536–37 (describing how one young mother’s youth
was held against her).
63. See id. at 536–38, 543.
64. See id. at 537–38. Katz represents adolescent parents who are in the foster care
system in Pennsylvania and has witnessed how courts handle adolescent parents during
dependency proceedings. Id. at 535.
[T]here are no age-based distinctions applied to minor parents in dependency
proceedings where minor parents are alleged to have abused or neglected
their own children; minor parents are held to the same standards of care and
control of their children as any other parent. The courts rarely take into ac-
count how the limitations on minors’ rights serve to inhibit the fulfillment of
their duties as parents. Often, the courts disregard these minors’ rights as par-
ents altogether, on the assumption that because of their minor status, they are
not entitled to the same procedural protections as their adult counterparts.
Id. at 543 (footnotes omitted).
65. See Mollborn, supra note 57, at 93 (describing the financial difficulties of parenthood,
regardless of one’s age).
66. See Katz, supra note 42, at 543.
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and other challenges for the adolescent parent, the child of the adoles-
cent, and society.67 This glaringly obvious connection between negative
outcomes and adolescent parenting is supported by countless studies
that have been conducted over the years, particularly since the 1970s.68
The earlier studies focused on the notion that adolescent childbear-
ing caused the negative outcomes, but regardless of the causation,
the Pig-Pen Phenomenon, linking poverty, low educational attain-
ment, mental and physical health issues, delayed or stunted career
options, and so on to those who parent young, is real and supported
by innumerable studies of adolescent parenthood and parenting.69
1. Adolescent Parents Are Negatively Impacted by
Childbearing in Adolescence
Having a baby during adolescence is likely associated with
negative outcomes in most aspects of a young person’s life.70 The
negative consequences of adolescent childbearing, according to an
analysis done by the National Research Council in 1987, are grave.71
Adolescent pregnancy is often accompanied by medical complications,
including higher rates of maternal mortality, premature birth, or low–
birth weight babies.72 Pregnant adolescents are more likely to neglect
their health during their pregnancies, which can negatively impact
their own health and that of the fetus.73 Being pregnant carries the
possibility of health complications, but it seems that pregnancy dur-
ing adolescence can make those risks even higher.74
In addition to the health risks that pregnant adolescents face,
there are significant impediments for adolescent parents when it
comes to educational attainment.75 Young women who are pregnant
or parenting are much less likely to graduate from high school or go
67. See, e.g., Shannon S. Carothers et al., Children of Adolescent Mothers: Exposure to
Negative Life Events and the Role of Social Supports on Their Socioemotional Adjustment,
35 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 827, 828 (2006) (“Adolescent mothers, as opposed to adult
mothers, are often characterized as being depressed, having low IQs, poor social supports,
histories of abuse and/or neglect, residential instability, stressful relationships, punitive
parenting practices, and a general lack of readiness to parent; each of these factors has
negative consequences for children’s development.” (citation omitted)).
68. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
70. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Ending Poverty by Cutting Teenaged Births: Promise,
Failure, and Paths to the Future, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 441–42 (1996).
71. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 123–39.
72. Id. at 124–25.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 125–28.
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on to college than those who delay childbearing to later in life.76 Once
they leave school,77 they are less likely to catch up and complete their
education than those who drop out for other reasons.78 Teenage fathers
also suffer educational detriment, although they seem to be affected
less dramatically than teenage mothers.79 A more recent study con-
ducted by Professor Stefanie Mollborn, however, has cast doubt on the
long held belief that adolescent pregnancy and parenting cause kids
to drop out of school.80
According to Professor Mollborn, recent studies have debunked
the theory that adolescent pregnancy and parenting have a direct ef-
fect on short term educational attainment.81 Studies that controlled
for non-pregnancy and parenting issues that tend to cause students
to drop out of school showed that the factors that cause adolescents
to drop out of school are the same ones that cause students to become
parents.82 Studies, however, have also shown that long-term educa-
tional attainment is affected by adolescent parenting, and Professor
Mollborn conducted a study to see if material resources, such as money
and child care, can improve long-term educational attainment.83 In-
stead of focusing on the individual attributes that might contribute to
a student dropping out of school, Professor Mollborn sought to analyze
the societal structure and its effects on educational attainment for
adolescent parents.84 Professor Mollborn pointed out that “[i]n public
discourse,” when attempting to isolate the reasons adolescent parents
suffer when it comes to educational attainment, people assume that
“personalities, aspirations, deviant tendencies, and race/ethnicity”
are the cause of the disruption in educational attainment.85
76. Id. at 126–27.
77. The National Research Council characterizes their leaving school as dropping
out, but it is unclear if they are voluntarily leaving school or forced out because of their
pregnancy status. See Kendra Fershee, Hollow Promises for Pregnant Students: How the
Regulations Governing Title IX Fail to Prevent Pregnancy Discrimination in School, 43
IND. L. REV. 79, 84–85 (2009); see also Michelle Gough, Parenting and Pregnant Students:
An Evaluation of the Implementation of the “Other” Title IX, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
211, 216–17, 256–64 (2011) (positing theories about why Title IX’s regulations barring
pregnancy discrimination have not been effective at accomplishing that goal).
78. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 127.
79. Id. at 126.
80. Mollborn, supra note 57, at 93 (“[B]ecoming a parent does not cause school drop-
out, but rather, preexisting socioeconomic and other factors cause both parenthood and
dropout.”).
81. Id. at 93. But see Daniel H. Klepinger et al., Adolescent Fertility and the Educa-
tional Attainment of Young Women, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 23, 27 (1995) (explaining that,
even after disaggregating factors that tend to cause students to drop out of high school,
adolescent parents do drop out of school at a higher rate than non-parenting students).
82. Mollborn, supra note 57, at 93.
83. Id. at 93–94.
84. Id. at 93.
85. Id.
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Professor Mollborn’s research showed that material resources
do positively influence long-term educational attainment for adoles-
cent mothers, and, to a smaller extent, for adolescent fathers.86 The
resources that it takes to support a child while the child’s parents are
engaged in other activities, such as school, are significant.87 An ado-
lescent parent has the same financial responsibilities to his or her
child as any other parent.88 Child care is not free, nor is food, housing,
clothing, or any number of other expenses that arise in caring for a
child.89 These financial hurdles that accompany adolescent parenting,
according to Professor Mollborn, are the obstacles to long-term educa-
tional attainment for young parents,90 and they are supplemented
by the struggles adolescent parents have in finding well paying and
fulfilling careers.91
Adolescent parents have a more difficult time working than those
who delay childbearing until later in life.92 Young parents are less
likely to be able to find work, to work in jobs that pay more than mini-
mum wage, and to work in jobs with which they are satisfied.93 Those
factors tend to diminish over time for the adolescent parent, but the
effects of the adolescent parent’s lower educational achievement and
his or her responsibilities in caring for a young child negatively affect
his or her chances of getting and retaining fulfilling and well-paid
employment significantly.94 These difficulties that young parents en-
counter when trying to find employment are also factors contribut-
ing to the statistics that indicate that adolescent parents are more
likely to live in poverty as well.95 In addition to employment and wage
challenges, adolescent parents are likely to struggle with poverty in
part because they typically parent alone.96
Adolescent mothers, in particular, are more likely to be econom-
ically disadvantaged and more likely to need public assistance than
women who waited longer to become parents.97 Studies have shown
86. Id. at 102.
87. See id. at 102–03.
88. See Mollborn, supra note 57, at 93.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 102.
91. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 130–32 (“[A]dolescent mothers




94. See id. at 131–32.
95. See id. at 132–34; Merritt, supra note 70, at 461.
96. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 128–29.
97. Id. at 132–33. But see Geronimus & Korenman, supra note 50, at 1189–90 (“[O]ur
findings . . . suggest[ ] that failure to control adequately for family background differ-
ences among women who have births at different ages may lead to overstated estimates
of the long-term socioeconomic consequences of teen childbearing.”).
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that the human capital of young mothers is significantly lower than
that of young women who do not have their first child until after the
age of twenty.98 Young white women who become parents in their teen
years make twenty-three percent less in wages than young white wo-
men who delay childbearing; young black women suffer a thirteen
percent reduction in wages as compared to their counterparts who
bear children later in life.99 The study of human capital focused on
the investments of young women in themselves, in terms of education
and wage earning in their early years, and determined that their child
care needs negatively affected their educational attainment and their
ability to save money in their youth.100 It is easy to imagine, under-
standing the probability of difficult life challenges that young parents
encounter, that the children of adolescents might also have increased
struggles in their young lives.101
2. Children May Suffer Many Harmful Effects from Being
Born to Young Parents
The campaigns aimed at stopping adolescents from becoming
parents are full of information about the terrible things that happen
to young people when they have a child before they reach adulthood.102
Those campaigns, presumably drawing on the conscience of a young
person who might be sexually active and at risk of becoming pregnant,
also share scary statistics about what happens to the children of ado-
lescent parents.103 They can struggle educationally, mentally, physi-
cally, and financially, and they have increased risks of joining a gang,
becoming a parent as a teen, and using drugs.104 Recent studies have
taken into account the likelihood of children of adolescent parents
to struggle in these areas because of their socioeconomic status, which
helps isolate them—whether the age of their mother when she had her
first child was actually a cause of their struggles in life.105 The results
of these studies indicate that the children of adolescent parents do
98. See Daniel Klepinger et al., How Does Adolescent Fertility Affect the Human Capital
and Wages of Young Women?, 34 J. HUM. RESOURCES 421, 425–26 (1999).
99. Id. at 443.
100. See id.
101. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 134–35, 138–39.
102. See, e.g., Preventing Unplanned and Teen Pregnancy: Why It Matters, NAT’L
CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, http://www.thenationalcampaign
.org/why-it-matters/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (explaining various negative
consequences of teen pregnancies).
103. See, e.g., id. (discussing developmental, health and social risks to children of un-
planned pregnancies as opposed to their planned counterparts).
104. Pogarsky et al., supra note 51, at 340; Preventing Unplanned and Teen Pregnancy:
Why It Matters, supra note 102.
105. See Pogarsky et al., supra note 51, at 333–34.
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indeed have a harder row to hoe in life than children who were born
to mothers who delayed parenting until adulthood.106
One study has suggested that children born to adolescent parents
have increased exposure to negative life events, which is associated
with less favorable childhood development.107 According to the study,
those negative life events associated with adolescent parenting include
“poverty, neighborhood crime, poor schools, . . . single parenthood,”
and low levels of maternal education.108 Exposure to negative life
events can increase the risk that a child will suffer from depression
and anxiety and be more likely to inappropriately internalize and
externalize.109 Most of the negative life experiences that many children
of adolescents encounter, however, are linked with the fact that many
children born to adolescents live in poor communities.110 Although
being born to an adolescent mother likely does not cause a child to be
exposed at a higher rate than other children to negative life events,
it is important to realize that these children are similarly at risk, or
perhaps more so, as are children growing up in extreme poverty.111
In addition to being exposed to more negative life events, young
children of young adolescent mothers are more likely to live in a
home environment that is not suitable for a small child.112 Younger
adolescent parents are more likely to expose their children to poor
home environments than adolescent parents who are over the age
of seventeen.113 The study also looked at whether the mother’s back-
ground characteristics, not her adolescence, might help explain the
poor home environment.114 Somewhat surprisingly, when the mother’s
background characteristics were taken out of the assessment of the
child’s home environment, the statistics indicated that children of ado-
lescent parents were more likely to live in a poor home environment.115
In other words, the adolescent parent’s home environment when she
became a parent was less likely to be the cause of her child’s poor
106. See id. But see Arline T. Geronimus et al., Does Young Maternal Age Adversely
Affect Child Development? Evidence from Cousin Comparisons in the United States, 20
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 585, 601–03 (1994) (finding that adolescent parents are not more
likely to have developmentally challenged children than adult parents of the same socio-
economic status).
107. Carothers et al., supra note 67, at 828.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 834.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Moore et al., supra note 60, at 150–51.
113. Id. at 151.
114. See id.
115. Id. In fact, while children of adolescent parents who are over the age of seventeen
are not more likely to live in poor home environments, when the study controlled for the
mother’s background characteristics, a statistically significant pattern of poor home
environments emerged even for the children of older adolescent parents. Id.
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home environment than the fact that she had a child. In these cir-
cumstances, it appears that teen pregnancy can cause children to
grow up in poor home environments.
Adolescent childbearing also appears to have a similar negative
effect on the “cognitive development and academic achievement” of
children born to adolescent parents.116 Children born to mothers aged
seventeen or younger are more likely to struggle with “mathematics,
reading recognition, and reading comprehension” than children born
to mothers aged eighteen or over.117 Similar to the study about poor
home environment, the mother’s background characteristics could
actually be ruled out as a major contributor to the cognitive develop-
ment and academic achievement shortfalls.118 When controlled for the
mother’s background characteristics, the studies showed a statistically
significant correlation between the fact that a child struggles with
academics and the fact that his or her parent is an adolescent, indi-
cating that adolescent parenting may be the cause of the academic
struggles for the child.119 Interestingly, however, in other areas such
as behavior problems or health and psychological well-being, there
were no statistical indicators that children of adolescent parents were
more likely to struggle than children of parents who were twenty
when they were born.120
In another study, published in 1993, researchers determined
that children born to adolescent mothers are more likely to suffer
maltreatment than children born when their parents were older.121
The study controlled for several factors, including the definition of
what a “young” mother is, what “maltreatment” is, detection bias (i.e.,
the theory that adolescent parents might be less able to conceal mal-
treatment for whatever reason than other parents), and for the fact
that young mothers often have many of the risk factors that lead to
increased likelihood of maltreatment (e.g., poverty, single parenthood,
and low educational attainment).122 The study found that children of
adolescent parents are at twice the risk of maltreatment, at an in-
creased risk of poor growth, and at a statistically significant increased
rate to experience a change in primary caretaker over children born
to older parents.123 Interestingly, with respect to the maltreatment
statistics, the study determined that in every instance of physical
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Moore et al., supra note 60, at 151.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 151, 155.
121. See Stier et al., supra note 51, at 646.
122. Id. at 642–43, 646.
123. Id. at 646.
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abuse recorded where the abuser was identified, the mother of the
child was not the abuser.124
Once again, there is debate among researchers about whether
adolescent parenting causes negative life outcomes for the children of
adolescent parents, but the studies indicate fairly clearly that the neg-
ative life outcomes are real for the children of adolescent parents.125
As such, the Pig-Pen Phenomenon does not just affect adolescent
parents; it appears to affect their children as well. The negative con-
sequences of teen childbearing, however, do not stop with the adole-
scent parents and their children. The parents of adolescent parents
tend to shoulder a heavy burden when their child becomes pregnant,
as does society as a whole.126 Certainly there are going to be negative
consequences for society when young people, ill-equipped to manage
the task and often unsupported in their efforts to do so, are responsible
for raising children.
3. Effects Are Felt by Society
It seems obvious that when negative consequences for adolescent
childbearing are evident for adolescent parents and their children,
there would be concomitant costs to society. How to define those costs,
however, is difficult. Once categories of study can be established, it
is also difficult to determine if adolescent pregnancy has a negative
effect on society. For example, one assumption is that adolescent par-
ents literally cost society money through government assistance.127
Another assumption may be that adolescent childbearing has contrib-
uted to the rise in crime statistics.128 Those assumptions have been
tested to determine what monetary costs society actually bears when
adolescents become parents.129
124. Id. There were 15 cases of physical abuse studied; in 10 of those cases, an abuser
was identified in the medical records. Id. In none of those 10 cases was the mother of the
abused child the abuser; the abusers “were seven fathers, two [other] relatives, and one
boyfriend of a mother.” Id. In the five cases where an abuser was not identified, only two
indicated that the mother was suspected of being the abuser. Id.
125. See supra Section II.A.2 (describing the effects of adolescent parenting on the child
born to the adolescent).
126. See infra Sections II.A.1 and II.A.3 (describing the negative outcomes for the ado-
lescent parent and on society as a whole).
127. See Susan Reimer, Preventing Teen Pregnancy Saves Taxpayers Billions, BALT.
SUN, June 15, 2011, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-06-15/features/bs-gl-reimer-teen
-pregnancy-20110616_1_teen-pregnancy-teen-mother-health-care (discussing a study that
found that teen childbearing cost taxpayers $10.9 billion in 2008).
128. See Patrick Fagan, The Real Root Causes of Violent Crime: The Breakdown of
Marriage, Family, and Community, BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 17, 1995, at 1, 16, available
at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1995/03/bg1026nbsp-the-real-root-causes-of
-violent-crime.
129. See Jeffrey Grogger, Incarceration-Related Costs of Early Childbearing, in KIDS
HAVING KIDS, supra note 40, at 231, 244–53, 254 n.7; V. Joseph Hotz et al., The Impacts
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First, the assumption that adolescent childbearing costs society
money through subsidies for young parents and their children is likely
false according to one 1997 study.130 In fact, the study’s researchers
were able to determine that if adolescents delayed childbearing for
three to four more years, the economic impact on the government
would actually increase.131 This surprising conclusion is logical when
taxes paid by parents who had their first child in adolescence are
factored into the equation.132 Parents typically work less when their
children are small, and adolescents typically work less than adults.133
As a result, if an adolescent has a child when she is less likely to be
paying payroll taxes anyway, when she does enter the workforce, she
will be in it longer during years when she has more earning potential
and paying more taxes than if she had delayed childbearing.134
While taxpayers may not spend more on adolescent parents
than on other people who receive government assistance, there does
appear to be a link between adolescent parenting and higher rates of
incarceration among children born to adolescent parents.135 Professor
Jeffrey Grogger determined that boys born to adolescent mothers “are
2.7 times more likely to be incarcerated” in their twenties than boys
born to older parents.136 He theorized that the lack of parenting skills
added to the hurdles in front of adolescent mothers makes it more
likely that their sons will engage in criminal behavior when they
reach adolescence.137 Professor Grogger stated:
Teen childbearing has been shown to reduce the mother’s educa-
tional attainment, her employment, her earnings, and her likeli-
hood of marriage. Single parents with lower human capital and
lower income may transmit to their children the kinds of eco-
nomic and social disadvantage that give rise to adolescent crime.
Furthermore, a young mother simply may lack the maturity re-
quired to be a good parent. As a result, her children may act out;
as adolescents, they may commit crime.138
of Teenage Childbearing on the Mothers and the Consequences of Those Impacts for
Government, in KIDS HAVING KIDS, supra note 40, at 55, 55–58, 79–85, 87–88 nn.24–27,
94 tbl. 3A.1.
130. Hotz, supra note 129, at 83–85 (“[G]overnment spending on public assistance will
not decline . . . even if society were able to get these women to postpone their childbearing
by substantially more than 3 to 4 years.” (footnote omitted)).
131. Id. at 83.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 74–79.
134. Id. at 83–85.
135. See Grogger, supra note 129, at 252–53.
136. Id. at 253.
137. Id. at 231.
138. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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There are quite a few assumptions going on here, many of which
may be entirely off base, but the data did indicate that if adolescent
mothers put off childbearing until they reached age eighteen, their
children would be less likely to be incarcerated, saving annual cor-
rections budgets $522 million.139
While it is difficult to determine what the financial cost of ado-
lescent childbearing is on society, it is not difficult to see that the
consequences of adolescent childbearing are costly in many ways. The
Pig-Pen Phenomenon indicates a serious societal cost associated with
adolescent childbearing: low educational attainment for adolescent
parents, economic struggles, single parenthood, cognitive delays in
children born to adolescent parents, children exposed to negative life
events at a higher rate, etc. In addition, adolescent pregnancy appears
to be, in most circumstances, avoidable, and it affects every sector of
society. With costs to individuals and society so high, it is a wonder
that parties in a position to intervene positively do not do so when it
appears that an adolescent parent is struggling—especially when at
least some of the Pig-Pen Phenomenon factors may be a result of legal
restrictions on adolescents that can actively interfere with their ability
to parent.
B. Adolescents Do Not Enjoy the Same Legal Rights as Adults
There are no restrictions on the rights of adolescents to become
parents, nor are there direct restrictions on the rights of adolescents
to parent their children.140 But all adolescents are restricted from full
participation in society because of their adolescence. Adolescents can-
not enter into contracts, work as many hours as they choose, rent an
apartment, drive cars (depending on their age), stay out as late as they
choose, and so on.141 There are few exceptions to the restrictions on an
adolescent’s ability to engage fully in society, even if the adolescent is
a parent.142 These restrictions are yet another reason adolescents may
struggle with their parenting responsibilities, but the tension between
an adolescent’s legal restrictions and parental role is rarely resolved
in favor of an adolescent parent when a state considers the best in-
terests of the child.
139. Id. at 252.
140. See supra Part I (describing the fundamental right to parent).
141. See Katz, supra note 42, at 543–48.
142. But see, e.g., id. at 545 (discussing a Pennsylvania law that allows pregnant teen-
agers to makes some choices regarding their health care).
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1. The Supreme Court’s Take on Adolescence and the
Law—Inside and Outside the Context of Parenthood
The Supreme Court once famously stated that there are three
reasons that children’s constitutional rights are not equal to those of
adults: “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance
of the parental role in child rearing.”143 The Court has made clear,
however, that minors are not restricted from constitutional protec-
tion altogether; in fact, the Court has made clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights are not reserved to adults alone.144
Stating that children have rights under the constitution is by no
means a declaration that children have equal protection as adults
under the law; the Court has been ready and willing to make rulings
that treat minors differently than adults in a number of contexts.145
A non-exhaustive list of decisions where the Court has ruled that
minors have fewer or different rights than adults includes rulings
where the Court has limited minors’ First Amendment rights146 and
Fourth Amendment rights,147 and where the Court held that the death
penalty may not be applied to persons who committed a capital crime
before their eighteenth birthday.148 The considerations are highly
contextualized, but the Court is clearly very comfortable with the
notion that minors can and should be treated differently under the
law than adults.149
143. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts statute
requiring a minor to seek permission from her parents before acquiring an abortion un-
constitutionally burdened her right to obtain an abortion).
144. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
145. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635–36 (“[T]he Court has held that the States validly
may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important,
affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.”).
146. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (holding that a
school principal’s decision to censor the school newspaper did not violate the students’
First Amendment rights).
147. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (holding that requiring
indiscriminate urine tests of student athletes did not violate the Fourth Amendment); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (finding that a school search “does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe
that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law”).
148. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18
when their crimes were committed.”).
149. See Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, in 2004 THE
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 355, 355–56 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2005) (arguing that
since its holding in In re Gault that children have rights, the Court has defined children’s
rights through an “adult-minus” approach, resulting in an impaired constitutional rights
analysis framework for children (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The Court in Bellotti v. Baird carefully considered the right of a
minor to have an abortion and, in so doing, discussed the gravity of
the decision to bear and raise a child.150 The Court stated that states
have a constitutional right to limit minors’ right to make important
life decisions because of the concern that minors “lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them.”151 In addition, the Court pointed out that
states often impose parental notice and consent requirements on the
rights of minors to make important decisions.152 Furthermore, the
Court stated that, “[a]s immature minors often lack the ability to
make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and
long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that
parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor.”153 Ultimately, however, the Bellotti Court held that the argu-
ably most important life decision, the choice to seek an abortion, can-
not constitutionally be usurped by the minor’s parents or the State.154
In coming to its conclusion that the U.S. Constitution does not
permit states to impose parental consent requirements upon a minor
seeking an abortion, the Court focused on the nature of pregnancy
and the unique position in which it puts minors.155 The Court looked
at the short time span a pregnant person has to decide whether she
wants to continue her pregnancy, as well as the burdens that accom-
pany pregnancy and motherhood, in deciding that the Massachusetts
statute requiring parental consent for a minor to seek an abortion was
unconstitutional.156 First, requiring parental consent in the context of
pregnancy is much more detrimental than in other contexts, such as
the decision to marry, which can simply be postponed until the minor
reaches the age of majority.157 Second, the Court weighed heavily the
gravity of the life impact a pregnancy can have on a person.158 In so
doing, the Court recognized that the decision to become a parent, and,
by extension—assuming she does not give up custody of the child—
the decision to parent a child, remains with the parent-to-be, even if
she is a minor.
150. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640–43.
151. Id. at 635 (footnote omitted).
152. See id. at 637–41 (“Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child’s chance for the full growth and ma-
turity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.”
(footnote omitted)).
153. Id. at 640 (footnote omitted).
154. See id. at 651.
155. Id. at 642–44.
156. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642–44.
157. Id. at 642 (“A pregnant adolescent . . . cannot preserve for long the possibility of
aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.”).
158. Id. at 642–43.
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Interestingly, the Court in Bellotti seems to believe that an
adolescent’s choice to become a parent is concomitant with her reach-
ing, under the law, adulthood.159 The Court recognized that forcing an
adolescent to complete an unwanted pregnancy might be exceptionally
burdensome because of her limited education, job skills, money, and
emotional maturity.160 The Court went on to say that “the fact of hav-
ing a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria
for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.”161 While it
seems true that the Court would agree that adolescent parents have
as many rights in raising their children as any other parent, it is not
true that all of the legal disabilities of minority are terminated once
a minor becomes a parent.162 When thinking back to those areas of the
law where courts have determined that minors have inferior rights
to adults, there are no explicit exceptions for minors who are parents.
In Bellotti, the Court gives its own example of an area of the
law where minors’ rights are more limited than those of adults: the
area of First Amendment law.163 The Bellotti Court relied on Ginsberg
v. New York, an earlier Supreme Court ruling where the conviction
of an individual for selling pornographic material to a seventeen-
year-old was upheld, and where the Court stated that the decision
did not trample any First Amendment rights of the minor, to show
that minors’ rights can be limited simply because of their minority.164
Nowhere in Ginsberg, nor in any other Supreme Court case allowing
more state intrusion into the lives of minors, does the Court carve out
an exception to the restriction for adolescent parents. Although access
to pornography or freedom from warrantless searches of school lockers
do not raise particular constitutional concerns for adolescent par-
ents more than other minors, the point is that parenthood does not
terminate the traditional “disabilities of minority,” as suggested by
the Bellotti Court. The constitutional restrictions on minors do not
end there, and some of the restrictions can be particularly harmful
to adolescent parents.
Constitutional rights are typically viewed as a binary system;
a person either has them or does not, and that determination typi-
cally depends on a person’s citizenship status, not his or her relation-
ship status.165 For minors, however, the Supreme Court has, in some
159. See id. at 642.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See infra Part II.B.2.
163. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 636.
164. See id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
165. See Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status as a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?: The Equal
Protection Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (arguing
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circumstances, treated constitutional rights as dependent upon the
rights of their parents to the care and control of their children.166 So,
minors’ constitutional rights can be seen, in some instances, as a slice
of their parents’ constitutional “pie.” Until Justice Douglas began
casting doubt on the paradigm in his dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder
in 1972, the Court viewed children’s rights through the lens of their
parents’ rights to care for and control their children.167 For example,
when a child’s First Amendment rights were at stake because the
State passed a law requiring her to attend a secular public school,
the Court evaluated her right to attend a sectarian school as her
parents’ right to direct and control her education.168 This system of
viewing a minor’s rights as dependent upon his or her parents’ rights
can be harmful to adolescent parents who are trying to engage in what
is perceived as a very adult activity: parenting.
Adolescents, including adolescent parents, are subject to limita-
tions on their constitutional rights that can be particularly harmful to
adolescent parents. First, adolescent parents cannot seek abortions
with the same freedom as adults.169 This puts adolescent parents in
the difficult position of possibly being forced to face parenthood more
than once during childhood. Second, adolescents do not have the same
due process rights as adults when being involuntarily committed to
mental institutions.170 In Parham v. J.R., the Court balanced the
rights of the parents against the rights of the child, and it deter-
mined that the rights of the parents to seek voluntary commitment
that unlawful status is constitutionally irrelevant because the Equal Protection Clause
applies to all persons in the United States).
166. See Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 55–63
(1999) (describing how the rights of children are framed).
167. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I disagree
with the Court’s conclusion that the matter is within the dispensation of parents alone.
The Court’s analysis assumes that the only interests at stake in the case are those of the
Amish parents on the one hand, and those of the State on the other. The difficulty with this
approach is that . . . the parents are seeking to vindicate not only their own free exercise
claims, but also those of their high-school-age children.”); see also Buss, supra note 166,
at 53 (agreeing with Justice Douglas that the State should not interject itself into the
development of a child’s religious identity).
168. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230–33; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400
(1923) (“Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give
his children education suitable to their station in life . . . .”).
169. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293, 297 (1997) (holding that a Montana
statute requiring a minor to notify at least one of her parents before she seeks an abor-
tion does not violate the constitution because the judicial bypass provision in Montana is
sufficient to protect minors who have good reason not to notify their parents); see also
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 692–94 (1977) (wrestling with the notion
that children’s constitutional rights can be invaded by the states more readily than those
of adults, but ultimately deciding that a provision prohibiting the sale of contraceptives
to persons under the age of 16 was unconstitutional).
170. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620–21 (1979).
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of the child to a mental institution outweighed whatever due process
rights the child had.171
Parham remains a particularly dangerous case for adolescent
parents. It is more dangerous to adolescent parents, in some ways,
than to adolescents who are not parents, because it holds open the
possibility that the parents of a pregnant or parenting adolescent
can trump her due process rights, which is an even higher-stakes
calculation when the adolescent is pregnant or parenting.172 The
Parham Court was more concerned with the possibility that an adver-
sarial hearing to determine whether a child should be committed to
a mental institution would further strain an already strained parent-
child relationship than it was concerned with the child’s due process
rights.173 When evaluating the potential value of such a hearing, the
Court stated: “Surely, there is a risk that it would exacerbate what-
ever tensions already exist between the child and the parents. . . . A
confrontation over such intimate family relationships would distress
the normal adult parents and the impact on a disturbed child almost
certainly would be significantly greater.”174 This preference for familial
stability—which ironically was likely impossible to achieve in light
of the parents’ desire to commit their children against their will to
mental institutions—over the due process rights of children indi-
cates a willingness by the Court to curtail children’s constitutional
rights when their relationship with their parents is strained and the
children’s mental stability is in question. These factors could also
apply to adolescent parents if the Court so chose.
Because the Court decided Parham in 1979, it appears clear that
the possible doomsday scenario painted above, that Parham could
be extended to commit adolescent parents to mental institutions with-
out due process, has not and will not arise. The fact remains, how-
ever, that adolescents labor under constitutional impediments placed
upon them because of their age, and those impediments do not dis-
appear if the adolescent becomes a parent.175 The fact remains that
some of those impediments can be particularly detrimental to ado-
lescent parents. The impediments do not, however, stop at constitu-
tional rights. Adolescents’ rights in the common law and statutory
171. Id. at 610 (“Another problem with requiring a formalized, factfinding hearing lies
in the danger it poses for significant intrusion into the parent-child relationship. Pitting
the parents and child as adversaries often will be at odds with the presumption that par-
ents act in the best interests of their child.”).
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (footnote omitted).
175. But see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (stating, as dicta, that minor
parents are treated as adults by the law).
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law are also treated differently in a way that can have a significant
negative impact on adolescent parents.
2. Statutory and Common Law Restrictions on
Adolescents’ Rights
Adolescents sometimes have fewer rights, and greater protec-
tions, under the law than adults. Legislatures often specifically ex-
empt adolescents from the rights and responsibilities that are created
in legislation.176 In many circumstances, depending on the age of the
adolescent, such statutory exemptions are made through reasoned
policy choices.177 In some instances, however, legislatures have affir-
matively barred adolescents from full participation in society in ways
that negatively impact adolescent parents and create additional obsta-
cles for parents who may already struggle in their role as parents.178
Those statutes seem to indicate either a misunderstanding of the
effect the law may have on an adolescent parent or a desire to send
messages to adolescents who are not parents that becoming a parent
before the age of majority will not be tolerated or supported.179
As stated above, there are no laws or court rulings that strip ado-
lescents of their parental rights simply because they are adolescents.180
It appears that most people can agree that doing so would violate the
Constitution and permit ugly governmental intrusions in the lives of
adolescents.181 But legislatures have not translated that reluctance
to insert themselves into an adolescent’s decision-making process
regarding whether she should become a parent to areas of the law
that might create difficult obstructions for an adolescent parent.
One example of a statute that directly targets adolescent parents
176. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-06-09 (West 2011) (stating that minor drivers
are largely exempt from sole liability for negligence imposed on adult drivers since the
individual who signed the minor’s license application, often the parent, is jointly and sev-
erally liable).
177. See, e.g., id. § 39-06-04 (representing the fact that most states do not permit minors
to receive instructional permits until they are, at a minimum, fourteen years of age, which
presumably ensures that most drivers are physically capable of driving and mature enough
to operate a vehicle responsibly).
178. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-46.02 (West 2011) (demonstrating that minors have
difficulty obtaining medical care without parental consent, making it even more difficult
for minor parents).
179. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 42, at 539 (asserting that welfare reform as well as in-
creased enforcement of statutory rape statutes constitute attacks on teenage pregnancy).
180. See id. (“Teenage parents have most of the same rights and responsibilities as par-
ents of any age.”).
181. But see Buss, supra note 23, at 786 (comparing the somewhat inconsistent hands-off
approach the Court and other lawmakers have taken regarding the rights of minors to
become parents with the very hands-on approach that lawmakers take when dealing with
minors’ rights in almost every other area of the law).
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and potentially makes their parenting responsibilities more difficult
to carry out is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“Welfare Reform Act”).182 While some pro-
visions of the Welfare Reform Act might be perceived as supportive of
adolescent parents, it is the sort of intrusion into adolescent parents’
lives that does not assess their individualized needs and can do more
harm than good.
The Welfare Reform Act is one of a very few pieces of federal
legislation that even acknowledges that adolescent parents exist.183
Unfortunately, it does so by denying adolescent parents public assis-
tance in certain circumstances.184 The provisions targeted at adoles-
cent parents require that, in order to receive public assistance, they
stay in school and live with their parents.185 It can easily be argued
that those provisions were intended to help adolescent parents stay
on the right track with their education and receive the support from
their parents that would likely be most beneficial to them during a
difficult time in their lives. It is possible that both of those things
could be true for some adolescent parents, but it is also possible that
the rigid requirements of the law make the lives of some adolescent
parents more difficult than they already were.
There are very realistic and understandable scenarios that ado-
lescent parents confront that would exclude them from public assis-
tance under the Welfare Reform Act, but these scenarios are not the
result of failures to be responsible parents. Requiring some adolescent
parents to stay in school and live in their parents’ home in order to re-
ceive public assistance might be the incentive they need to continue
with their education in order to reach bigger goals for themselves and
their children in the future. Consider, however, a situation where an
adolescent parent cannot obtain adequate care for her child while she
is in school.186 That simple and realistic scenario might require her to
drop out of school—assuming she could not find after-school work
182. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 408(a)(4)–(5), 110 Stat. 2105, 2135–36 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered titles of the U.S.C.) (denying assistance to those adolescent parents “who do
not attend high school or other equivalent training program” or who do not live “in adult-
supervised settings”).
183. See also Kendra Fershee, An Act for All Contexts: Incorporating the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act into Title IX to Help Pregnant Students Gain and Retain Access to
Education, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 281, 316 & n.241 (2010) (discussing the first piece of federal
legislation aimed at supporting pregnant and parenting students in schools, The Pregnant
and Parenting Students Access to Education Act of 2010).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(4)–(5) (2006).
185. Id.
186. See id. § 618(b) (containing provisions for block grants to states to provide child care
to those receiving assistance under the Act, but not guaranteeing that everyone under the
Act will receive any assistance, much less a particular amount of assistance).
2012] A PARENT IS A PARENT 453
that would pay her enough to cover her child care costs, which is not
an unrealistic assumption. This in turn would exclude her from re-
ceiving public assistance.187 Another potentially dangerous scenario
that would work as a barrier to an adolescent parent’s parenting suc-
cess is linked to the requirement that she live with her parents or
some equivalent adult supervision.188
The Welfare Reform Act does provide for some exceptions to the
requirement that an adolescent live with her parents in order to re-
ceive assistance under the Act.189 Those exceptions take into account
the possibility that the relationship between the parent, adolescent
parent, and minor child could be abusive, or that the adolescent parent
does not have a parent or legal guardian.190 The law, however, cannot
contemplate a scenario where the relationship between the parent and
the adolescent parent is not abusive, but in some other way toxic. For
example, the parent of the adolescent parent may resent the fact that
he or she has been unwittingly shoved into the role of grandparent
and caregiver to a small child. Requiring adolescent parents to live
with their parents in order to receive public benefits could result in
resentment and hostility at home, which would not be a supportive
environment that encourages them to be the best parents they could
be. A toxic home environment is not a good place to raise a child, and
it is a place where other problems for the adolescent parent can arise.
Adolescent parents, in light of the roadblocks presented to them
by laws like the Welfare Reform Act, might be likely to act out in
ways that insert them into the Child and Family Services realm, even
though they are generally good and loving parents. Adolescent parents
who are forced to live with their parents might be more likely to stay
out late and engage in behavior that might be typical for a teen, but
potentially disastrous for a parent. Parents who are forced to sup-
port their children after they become parents at an early age might
be more likely to call Child and Family Services on their children for
behavioral issues that are relatively minor. The Welfare Reform Act’s
one-size-fits-all approach to limiting public assistance to adolescent
parents is but one example of the detrimental effects of the law on
adolescent parents.
For centuries, judges have been creating common law that can
interfere with adolescent parents’ abilities to parent. One obvious
187. See id. § 618(b)(2) (demonstrating the exclusion of minor parents needing child care
assistance to stay in school from those benefitting from the majority of funds by requiring
that 70 percent of block grant funds for child care be made available to families receiving
assistance under the Act, those engaging in work activities in order to transition off the
assistance, and those who were at risk of becoming dependent on the assistance).
188. Id. § 608(a)(5)(A).
189. Id. § 608(a)(5)(B).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(5)(B)(ii).
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common law impediment to minors that affects adolescent parents
significantly is the prohibition on the ability to enter into contracts.191
Denying minors the right to enter into binding contracts bars them
from the ability to rent housing, buy or lease a car, or borrow money.
Simply put, the law fails to allow adolescent parents to provide basic
needs to their children; it requires adolescent parents to be dependent
on their parents, the government, or disinterested third parties in
order to survive. While they are expected to provide the same oppor-
tunities and benefits to their children as any parent, they are ex-
pected to do so with a limited tool kit and a forced dependence that
can thwart their efforts to provide. They are not legally equipped to
adequately build a stable home for their children, but, if an accusation
of unfitness is leveled against them, there is little recognition of the
very legal impediments that might have contributed to their struggles
as parents.
The law not only stands in the way of adolescent parents’ ability
to parent by making it difficult for them to engage fully in the things
good parents do—working, making a home, choosing a nurturing
and supportive community in which to raise children—it also does
so more directly. The very process that states use to evaluate the
fitness of a parent and determine custody of children of parents who
have been declared unfit can create obstacles for adolescent parents’
success.192 The obstacles may be inadvertent, but they are unfair, un-
just, and, most importantly, unconstitutional. Understanding how the
process works and where states are failing to understand the con-
stitutional rights of adolescent parents might help solve the problem.
The more crucial fix, however, lies in the need for affirmative re-
minders to courts that adolescent parents do have the right to parent
and that their minority cannot be used against them as a justification
for terminating their parental rights or removing custodial rights to
their children.
III. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS: ADJUDICATION OF A PARENT’S
FITNESS AND DISPOSITION OF CUSTODY
The process of removing a child from the home of his or her
parents is, in most states, bifurcated into a two-step process. First,
the court will do an assessment of the fitness of the parent to provide
for the child, often called the adjudication phase.193 If the adjudication
191. See Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U.S. 300, 306 (1880) (holding that a contract signed by
a minor is voidable by the minor).
192. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 42, at 554 (stating that there is also an assumption that
“a teenager is a per se unfit parent” in child abuse hearings and similar proceedings).
193. KAREN S. BUDD ET AL., EVALUATION OF PARENTING CAPACITY IN CHILD PROTECTION
25 (2011).
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results in a finding that the parent is somehow unfit to parent, the
court will then move on to consider how to handle the custody of the
child.194 In every state, as well as in every American territory that is
not a state (i.e., District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands),
there is a statute that requires the court to evaluate the “best inter-
ests of the child” at some point in the process of evaluating the fitness
of the parent or determining custody for the child.195 At each step of
the process, states should be more sensitive to the challenges and dif-
ficulties encountered by adolescent parents and should include statu-
tory guidance to courts so that they do not violate the constitutional
rights of the adolescent parents by unfairly holding their minority
against them.
A. Determining Fitness of Adolescent Parents: Adjudication
Although there might be some disagreement, it seems fair to
say that the government is generally not in the business of directing
and controlling how parents raise their children.196 If there is a rea-
son for the State to get involved in a child’s life, however, it will do
so in order to protect that child from harm. A parent generally may
find himself or herself thrust into the child and family services realm
when a complaint is made about his or her parenting.197 If the state
agency responsible for reviewing complaints deems it necessary, it
will open an investigation of the situation.198 If the agency determines
there is merit to the accusation, it may seek to have the child declared
a dependent of the state, which then may lead to a determination of
whether the parent’s parental rights should be terminated.199
There are obvious constitutional considerations when intervening
in a parent’s right to the care and control of her children. The Supreme
Court has made clear that parents have due process protections when
their fitness is evaluated by a state court.200 The process can vary
from state to state, but the fundamental process guaranteed by the
Constitution must be fair and apply the correct evidentiary standard
before parents can be deprived of their rights to their children.201 That
194. See id.
195. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 6, at 1.
196. See Katz, supra note 42, at 540.
197. See Investigation, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES, http://www.childwelfare.gov/responding/iia/investigation (last visited
Mar. 30, 2012).
198. See BUDD ET AL., supra note 193, at 23.
199. See 1 THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS §§ 2:59,
2:67 (2011).
200. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
201. Id.
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standard, held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Santosky to require
states to prove by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights
should be terminated, is high because even if they have not been
model parents, parents nonetheless “retain a vital interest in prevent-
ing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”202 Unfortunately,
the process used to terminate an adolescent’s parental rights can be
stacked against them and leave them incapable of preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family.203
Adolescent parents are subjected to the same process as any
parent when their fitness is called into question.204 There are no alter-
native statutory bases for determining whether an adolescent parent’s
parenting is in keeping with “community standards.” On the one
hand, this makes sense, because the process of determining parental
fitness is really meant to protect the child at risk; the age of the par-
ent is immaterial to the health and well-being of the child.205 On the
other hand, if the parent of the child at risk is an adolescent, there
may be intervening factors that have contributed to the situation
that either are out of the adolescent parent’s control and solvable with
the help and understanding of the court, or are the result of the ado-
lescent parent’s ignorance and immaturity (but are not indicative of
a longer-term, systemic parenting deficiency) that can be corrected
with support and training.206 Ignoring an adolescent parent’s minority
and treating him or her as any other parent in the adjudication and
disposition processes could lead to an unconstitutional intrusion into
the adolescent parent’s right to parent.
While the process for declaring a parent unfit varies from state
to state, there are a few constants that every state must observe.
First, as is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there must be a process.207 Second, the process must
be constitutionally sound, which, in this circumstance, requires, as
stated above, that the State prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent is unfit to parent.208 Parental fitness is decided based
on an assessment of the parent’s ability to meet community standards
regarding the care and well-being of his or her child.209 This process
202. Id. at 753.
203. See Katz, supra note 42, at 554.
204. See Buss, supra note 23, at 786 (noting that the law “afford[s] minors the same right
as adults to assume parental authority”).
205. See Katz, supra note 42, at 542.
206. See id. at 537.
207. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (“[S]tate intervention to
terminate the relationship between [a parent] and her child must be accomplished by
procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.”).
208. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
209. See JACOBS, supra note 199, § 2:2 (“These ‘community’ standards are established
through dependency statutes and the case law interpreting these statutes.”).
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is called a dependency adjudication and is essentially a fact-finding
process that allows the State to present evidence that the parent has
not met statutory requirements regarding the care and control of his
or her children and allows the parent to refute that evidence.210
There are multiple reasons the government might open an inves-
tigation of a parent. If a parent has been neglectful or abusive of his
or her child, he or she can be investigated for those wrongdoings.211
Other bases for opening an investigation can include: “emotional
neglect[,] malnutrition[,] failure to thrive[,] medical care neglect[,] . . .
dirty or unsafe home[,] . . . failure to protect[,] mental illness of parent
or child[,] destitute child[,] lifestyle,” or others.212 An accusation of any
of the above, or a combination thereof, can be the basis for a depend-
ency hearing in court.213 A dependency hearing is what the process
is called when a court is asked to determine whether a minor should
be declared a dependent of the state.214
During the dependency adjudication process (also sometimes
called the adjudication process), the court can, depending on the state,
take a number of paths. The Supreme Court has determined that at
the adjudication stage the Due Process Clause requires that the par-
ent’s fitness be evaluated without considering the best interests of
the child.215 If the minor is declared dependent during the adjudica-
tion phase, the court then moves on to the disposition phase, where
the determination of what will happen next for the minor child and
his or her parent will be made.216 At that stage, the court can take any
number of paths, but regardless of the path the court takes, the child
is considered a ward of the court until the court decides that the child
does not need the court’s protection any longer.217 The court can then
apply the best interests of the child test to decide whether it would
be best for the child to stay with the parent despite the dependency
determination.218 The court can also remove the child from the parent’s
custody on a temporary basis or decide to commence proceedings to
terminate parental rights.219
210. Id. § 2:59.
211. See id. § 2:14.
212. Id.
213. See id. §§ 2:14, 2:33.
214. See id. § 2:67.
215. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (reasoning that the interests of the
parent and child are entangled until the parent’s fitness is determined, and only when
the parents is declared unfit can the child’s interests be evaluated independent of the
parent’s interests).
216. JACOBS, supra note 199, § 2:67.
217. Id.
218. Id. § 2:67 n.3.
219. Id.
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B. Determining the Best Interests of the Child: Disposition
Family or juvenile court judges carry an unenviable burden
when they are asked to decide whether a parent should lose his or
her parental rights. Even “easy” cases, where a parent has severely
abused or neglected his or her child, cannot be easily decided because
when a judge terminates parental rights, those rights can never be
reinstated (a parent can certainly appeal a termination decision, but
once the appeals have been exhausted, the parent has no recourse).220
State legislatures have attempted to help judges shoulder the burden
by writing statutes that give them guidance about the factors that
should be taken into account when deciding the fate of a family.221
These factors are considered in the tests that are meant to help courts
determine the best interests of the child at each phase of the adjudi-
cation and disposition processes.222 The best interests of the child tests
include factors that encourage courts to consider both the unfavor-
able and favorable aspects of the parent-child relationship and are
meant to protect the children from harm.223 They do not, however,
consider one of the most crucial considerations: whether the parent
is an adolescent.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRES THAT JUDGES BE CAREFUL
TO SEPARATE THE IMPEDIMENTS OF ADOLESCENCE FROM THE
PARENTAL FITNESS ANALYSIS DURING THE ADJUDICATION
PHASE TO AVOID TRAMPLING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN
As stated above, all parents have a substantive due process right
to the care and control of their children.224 Of course, that right is not
universal and inviolate; the State has the power to interfere with that
right if the parent’s authority and control puts the welfare of the child
at risk.225 Unless the State intervention is “shown to be necessary for
or conducive to the child’s protection against some clear and present
danger,” it is not constitutionally permissible for the State to pass a
law that interferes with that right.226 In Prince v. Massachusetts, the
Court considered the constitutionality of legislation that barred chil-
dren under the age of twelve from selling religious magazines.227 The
220. But see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/14.5 (2009) (allowing a biological parent who lost
his or her parental rights to a child to adopt the child, if certain conditions are met).
221. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 6, at 2.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 3–5.
224. Katz, supra note 42, at 539.
225. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 159–60.
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Court held that the law was a constitutional infringement on both
the parent’s liberty interest in raising her child and her religious
liberty.228 In the case of child welfare laws, there is no patent consti-
tutional deprivation of the substantive due process rights of adoles-
cent parents per se, but, as those laws are applied, adolescent parents’
liberty interests can be infringed by an indelicate court.229
In the case of child welfare laws that bar physical, emotional, and
mental abuse and/or neglect, there is no argument that those laws
unconstitutionally target adolescent parents to strip them of their
fundamental liberty interest to parent. As stated in Prince, the State
may restrict the parent’s authority over his or her child due to its gen-
eral interest in protecting the welfare of children.230 That, of course,
is as it should be. If parents are unfit and present a clear and present
danger to the welfare of their children, their rights to raise a child
should be scrutinized and perhaps severed by the State. A constitu-
tional concern, when considering the liberty interest of adolescent
parents to the care, control, and custody of their children, appears
when a court seeks to interfere with that right, not because the par-
ent is unfit, but because the adolescent parent is barred by the law
from providing the best care to his or her children or is engaging in
adolescent behavior.
A troubling pitfall that judges may encounter while determining
the fitness of an adolescent parent is failing to recognize the legal
impediments placed on adolescents.231 Those impediments can put
an adolescent parent in the position of having to choose between
providing proper care to his or her child and obeying the law. For
example, an adolescent parent may have to miss more school than
is permissible to care for her child. This could be used against her in
an adjudication. Similarly, an adolescent parent who tries to improve
a bad living situation by leaving her residence (perhaps she lives with
an abusive boyfriend or in unhealthy conditions) may find herself
homeless because she cannot legally rent an apartment. In situations
like this, finding a parent unfit would violate his or her substantive
due process right to parent, because he or she is forced by the law into
the position of putting her child at risk.
An adolescent parent who cannot work enough hours, because
of his or her age, to make enough money to buy food or rent an
apartment is certainly at risk of losing her child in a dependency
228. See id. at 173.
229. See Katz, supra note 42, at 554.
230. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (“Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control . . . .”).
231. See supra Part II.B.
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proceeding.232 The fact that the child of the adolescent parent is mal-
nourished, inappropriately clothed, homeless, or dirty are certainly
serious problems that require intervention.233 A results-oriented judge
would be right to seek to correct those problems immediately. Without
a deeper inquiry into why the child is suffering those conditions, how-
ever, a judge may be quick to interfere in the parent-child relationship
without fully considering the adolescent parent’s intent and desire to
provide adequate care, as well as the adolescent parent’s legal inability
to do so. Judges must be careful in the adjudication process to avoid
inferring a parental fitness flaw rooted in an anti-youth bias, as op-
posed to a fundamental parenting flaw that cannot be rectified with
support and services.
In addition to the legal constraints adolescent parents have on
their ability to parent, courts should also be cognizant of the possi-
bility that they could mistake adolescent behavior for unfitness. As
stated above, the Prince Court held that a state law that violated a
fundamental liberty of a parent “must fall,” unless the state enacted
that law to protect the child from clear and present danger.234 In the
case of child welfare laws, it is entirely likely that the State may have
to protect a child from a clear and present danger posed by his or her
adolescent parent. In those cases, the court should intervene to protect
the endangered child immediately. The court runs the risk, however,
of violating the substantive due process rights of the adolescent parent
if it is hypersensitive to the adolescent behavior of the parent and
imputes from that behavior a nonexistent clear and present danger
to the minor child. There is a long list of adolescent behaviors that
may indicate to a court that an adolescent parent is unfit to parent,
when in fact all that parent needs is support and services to become
a better parent.235
Adolescent parents often struggle to be “perfect” parents.236 These
struggles may have less to do with their adolescence and more to do
with the circumstances of their lives, which were in place long before
they had children.237 To the extent that their lack of life experience,
maturity, and self-control do contribute to their struggles to parent,
it may be more of an indication that they need help, training, and
support to understand the responsibilities of their status as parents
232. See BUDD ET AL., supra note 193, at 18 tbl. 1.1.
233. See id.
234. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
235. See Mollborn, supra note 57, at 102–03 (“[P]roviding teenage parents with resources
may . . . improv[e] socioeconomic conditions for both parent and child.”).
236. See supra Part II.A (describing the difficulties faced by adolescent parents).
237. See supra Part II.A.
2012] A PARENT IS A PARENT 461
and to improve their parenting skills. While staying out past curfew,
missing school, or the recreational use of drugs and alcohol could be
an indication of a bigger parenting problem, they may simply indi-
cate that, like many parents, this particular adolescent parent needs
intervention and support to be a better parent. A court that is quick
to declare an adolescent parent unfit for engaging in irresponsible
adolescent behavior is not following the Prince holding; it requires
that state intervention into the parent-child relationship be reserved
to situations where the welfare of the child of the adolescent parent
is in “clear and present danger.” 238
Not only do parents have a substantive due process right to
parent their children, they also are constitutionally protected in the
dependency process from severance of their parental rights without
sound procedural due process.239 The Santosky Court decided that
states must use the more exacting “clear and convincing evidence
standard” when determining whether to terminate parental rights.240
Because the right to parent is fundamental and the decision to termi-
nate is final, the Court held that a lower standard would violate the
procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.241
Not only do courts have to uphold and respect adolescent parents’
fundamental rights to parent their children, they also need to be care-
ful that the process they apply when deciding whether to terminate
the parental rights of an adolescent is constitutionally sound. Because
adolescents are uniquely hindered by the law from being able to fully
realize their parenting responsibilities, a court should be particularly
careful about interfering with their procedural rights to parent unless
it is convinced that the parental deficiencies are not solely a result
of the parents’ adolescence.
Procedural due process also requires that courts avoid conflat-
ing adolescent behavior with the fitness analysis. Because states are
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is
unfit, courts cannot take into consideration the fact that the adoles-
cent parent is an adolescent.242 It is easy to imagine, considering how
high the stakes are in dependency proceedings, that courts would be
willing to use against adolescent parents behavior that might be con-
sidered that of a “typical teen,” but not the sort of behavior that would
be considered egregious enough to interfere with an adult parent’s
238. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
239. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
240. Id. at 769 (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Id. at 768.
242. See id. at 767 (“The State’s interest in finding the child an alternative permanent
home arises only ‘when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a
normal family home for the child.’ ” (citation omitted)).
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right to parent his or her children.243 There is a significant amount of
discretion allowed to the judge when determining whether a parent
has violated “community standards” and is therefore unfit to parent.244
This discretion can leave adolescent parents vulnerable to a judge’s
interpretation that juvenile, and correctable, behavior automatically
makes a parent unfit.
The standard of clear and convincing evidence that courts must
use to declare a parent unfit should focus on facts that indicate that
the adolescent parent’s child is in danger. Those facts can certainly in-
clude adolescent behavior that is putting the minor child in danger.
A judge must be careful, however, to avoid letting an anti-youth bias,
or negative assumptions about the ability of adolescent parents to
be good parents, factor into the community standards analysis. A
few obvious examples of subjective categories of behavior that can
serve as the basis for declaring an adolescent parent unfit are signs of
emotional neglect, a dirty or unsafe home, and lifestyle, which each in-
dividual judge can view quite differently.245 When applied to an adoles-
cent parent in the adjudication phase of a dependency hearing, those
bases can be viewed in such a way that paints a picture of a terrible
parent, or, alternatively, they can be seen as depicting an inexperi-
enced, perhaps selfish, parent in need of guidance and support.
Disentangling a parent’s adolescence from the allegation of par-
enting deficiencies is obviously a difficult task. It is easy to assume
that the State must have a good reason to make an allegation that a
parent is unfit, and protecting children from harm is one of the most
important things a state does. It is precisely because those reasons
make the stakes high in child welfare inquiries that courts should be
all the more careful to protect the substantive and procedural due
process rights of adolescent parents and avoid making assumptions
about their ability to parent based on their youth as opposed to their
capabilities. In addition, legislatures should help courts protect the
constitutional rights of adolescent parents by including a factor into
243. While anecdotal evidence of courts doing this is available, it is difficult to confirm
that this sort of bias is happening in court because many family and juvenile court proceed-
ings are closed and court decisions are sealed to protect the privacy of the parties involved.
See Jan L. Trasen, Note, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: Do Closed
Hearings Protect the Child or the System?, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359, 366–67 (1995).
Staying out late, missing school, and recreational use of drugs and alcohol, may at first
glance appear to factor into whether an adolescent parent is fit to parent. Unless it has
a negative impact on the child, irresponsible behavior does not signal a problem with the
parent’s fitness as much as a need for training and support for the adolescent parent. See
BUDD ET AL., supra note 193, at 14 (noting that the policy rationale behind The Family
Preservation and Support Initiative was to “assist vulnerable children and families prior
to any maltreatment”).
244. JACOBS, supra note 199, § 2:2.
245. Id. § 2:14.
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the best interests of the child test that warns courts to treat adoles-
cent parents as they do adult parents.
V. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE REQUIRES THAT JUDGES
CONSIDER THE YOUTH OF ADOLESCENT PARENTS DURING THE
DISPOSITION PHASE TO AVOID HOLDING THEM TO STANDARDS
TO WHICH ADULT PARENTS ARE NOT SUBJECT
Adolescents have the same fundamental right to parent as any
other person in America. Despite the angst that adult parents, legis-
lators, school teachers, doctors, researchers, and most every segment
of society has about the concept of teen parenting, the law is clear
that age may not be a factor in determining whether a person has a
constitutional right to be a parent to his or her biological children.246
It is also clear, however, that there are significant hurdles and chal-
lenges that adolescent parents almost universally encounter.247 Not
only do many adolescent parents live in poverty before becoming par-
ents, which only adds financial strain, they often struggle with pur-
suing their education throughout the early years of their children’s
lives.248 In addition to the socioeconomic and educational challenges
they face, adolescent parents are denied the basic rights that adults
enjoy, making it even more difficult to provide for their children.249
To account for the inequality of the application of the laws to ado-
lescent parents as compared to adult parents and the circumstances
of life that make adolescent parenting more difficult than parenting
during adulthood, legislatures should write a new best interests of the
child factor into state law. This factor would alert courts to the legal
and circumstantial difficulties that are often outside of the control
of an adolescent parent and would help courts minimize any potential
infringement on adolescent parents’ right to equal protection of the
laws as well. While treating adolescent parents differently in the best
interests of the child factors may seem counterintuitive to equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, it may be the best way to ensure that courts
treat adolescent parents equally to adult parents. Unfortunately, the
best interests of the child factors may be inadequate to protect minor
children from removal from their parent’s custody without proper
justification. A factor that alerts or reminds courts of the unique chal-
lenges that adolescent parents face and encourages courts to consider
intervention and support before removal may be a practical solution
246. See note 180 and accompanying text.
247. See supra Part II.B.1.
248. See supra Part II.A.
249. See supra Part II.B.
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for preventing courts from unconstitutionally holding the adolescent
parents’ youth against them in the disposition analysis.
A. Adolescent Parents Enjoy a Liberty Interest in Raising Their
Children That Is Supported by the Equal Protection Clause
While there is no Supreme Court precedent indicating that age
or parental status are suspect classes, it is clear that laws that are
applied unequally to similar groups of people without a rational basis
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.250
The question arises, therefore, in the context of adolescent parenting,
whether it is rational for a court to assume that the age of the parent
will put the child in danger. It seems clear that the answer should
be no. The age of the adolescent parent is less important than the
action or inaction of the parent and how that affects the minor child.
An assumption based on the age of the parent that he or she is less
capable of improving his or her parenting skills251 than a adult parent
would not be rational, especially considering the additional hurdles
adolescent parents confront in their parenting efforts that are out-
side of their control.252 It is certainly just as possible for an adolescent
parent to be able to improve his or her parenting as an adult parent.
There is no legal or scientific support, however, for the notion that
adolescent parents are inherently less capable of parenting than
anyone else.
It is difficult to give examples where courts have violated the
constitutional rights of adolescent parents by using age against them
because courts are under no obligation to report the age of the parents
who are respondents in dependency hearings.253 In fact, those records
are often sealed.254 Anecdotally, however, there is plenty of evidence
that courts are punishing parents for being adolescents, instead of
trying the simpler and more effective method of supplying services
and training to help adolescent parents adjust to being parents at a
young age.255 A logical place for courts to look for guidance when deter-
mining whether an adolescent parent should retain parental rights is
250. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
251. This would be the consideration at the disposition stage, because the parent has
been declared unfit in some way to get to this point in the procedures. See notes 193–94
and accompanying text.
252. See supra Part II.B.
253. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADM’R, SUPREME COURT STEERING COMM. ON
FAMILIES & CHILDREN IN THE COURT, A PARENT’S GUIDE TO JUVENILE DEPENDENCY COURT
2, available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/family/bin/dependencybooklet.pdf.
254. Id.
255. See Katz, supra note 42, at 536.
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the best interests of the child test. This is a state-by-state statutory
construct used to help courts balance factors that weigh in favor of
and against a parent in the adjudication and disposition phases of
dependency hearings.256 Every state, commonwealth, and district in
the United States has a version of the best interests of the child test,
though the factors in the tests vary from state to state.257
B. Incorporating a New Best Interests Factor That Encourages
Judges to Support, Not Punish, Adolescent Parents for Their
Youth Would Help Judges Apply the Laws Equally
As stated above, the Supreme Court has stated that the right
to parent is fundamental, and it has never carved out an exception
for adolescent parents.258 But public opinion, coupled with troubling
statistics, about the ability of adolescents to parent may encourage
judges to more proactively interfere with adolescent parents’ rights,
even when their parenting wrongs are not so egregious as to justify
a loss of custody.259 Worse, courts may not be aware that adolescent
parents have legitimate reasons to struggle or that these struggles
may be outside of their control.260 Also, as stated above, the Equal
Protection Clause mandates that courts have a rational basis for inter-
fering with adolescent parents’ parenting rights more frequently than
they interfere with the rights of adult parents.261 For these reasons,
legislatures should help alert courts to the unique problems encoun-
tered by adolescent parents and include a best interests of the child
factor that encourages courts to proceed with caution when consid-
ering how to intervene when their parenting is questioned in the
dependency process.
Adolescent parents do not have the same legal rights and privi-
leges that adult parents have. They do, however, have the same respon-
sibilities and duties regarding the care and control of their children
256. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 6, at 1–4.
257. Id.
258. The Court has also never affirmed that adolescent parents have a fundamental
right to parent, but in the absence of such a ruling, it seems fair to assume that a parent
is a parent and his or her fundamental right to parent is protected no matter age. See
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating clearly that parents have the
fundamental right to the care and control of their children).
259. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 42, at 536–37 (relating the story of one adolescent’s right
to parent being terminated).
260. See id. at 544 (“Whether emancipated or not, many of the age-based limitations
on the rights of minors have a direct effect on teenage parents’ ability to provide properly
for their children.”).
261. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); see also Katz,
supra note 42, at 553 (demanding that courts respect the rights of teen parents during
adjudication and disposition).
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as adult parents. This legal tightrope sometimes creates an untena-
ble situation for adolescents that may contribute to their struggles
and failures as parents. Legislatures should write a best interests
of the child factor that would alert judges, who may not think of the
balancing act when they preside over the disposition phase of depend-
ency hearings, to make sure that their reasons for intervention into
the constitutionally protected parenting right are the same reasons
the court would use to intervene in an adult parent’s parenting right.
Helping courts stay alert to potential bias against adolescent parents
would protect adolescent parents from unconstitutional interference
with their parenting rights and would do more to preserve what could
be, with some support, healthy parent-child relationships.
As stated above, the best interests of the child tests vary from
state to state.262 There are a few universal similarities, however, that
are important to note. First is the overarching reason for the factors,
which is to protect children from harm.263 Second, they are meant to
maintain the integrity of the family unit, when at all possible.264 Third,
they all omit any reference to the consideration of a parent’s age in
the disposition process.265
1. Best Interests Tests Are Intended to Protect Children from
Harm, While Preserving the Family Unit When Possible
There is an important governmental interest in protecting chil-
dren from harm.266 The definition of harm has changed from a time
when states were loath to intervene in a parent’s right to discipline
a child267 to a time when government actors recognize the importance
of preserving families to the extent possible.268 The legal approach
to answering the difficult question of who should have custody of
children when maltreatment is alleged has also changed over the
262. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 6, at 1–4.
263. Id. at 2.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 3 (listing the commonly required factors for determining the best in-
terests of a child, not including the age of the parent).
266. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
267. See, e.g., BUDD ET AL., supra note 193, at 9–10 (discussing the 1874 case of “Mary
Ellen,” a child in foster care whose severe abuse by her foster parents was overlooked by
the authorities until pressured to do so by the president of the New York Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals).
268. See id. at 13–15. The pendulum is settling in between the two options of favoring
that abused or neglected children be removed from their parents’ custody and making
“reasonable efforts” to maintain the parent-child relationship. See id. While federal law
does still require that agencies make reasonable efforts to maintain the parent-child
relationship, it does not value the parent-child relationship over the safety of the child
when severe abuse or neglect is at issue. Id. at 14–15; see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006)
(noting that children’s safety is a “paramount concern”).
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years. Since the birth of the legal system, most governments consid-
ered the role of raising children to be filled solely by parents, largely
because children were considered their fathers’ chattel.269 In the
United States in the mid- to late 1900s, states and the federal gov-
ernment eventually moved toward a more interventionist approach
that invoked the concept of parens patriae.270 Parens patriae means
“country as parent” and is rooted in the notion that the government
has a moral right to intervene when a parent is abusing or neglecting
his or her child.271
States have become increasingly careful in the years that the
child welfare system has evolved only to intervene in the parent-child
relationship when there is actual maltreatment of a child. Maltreat-
ment of a child is defined as recent acts or failures to act by a parent
or caregiver that result in physical, emotional, or sexual abuse of a
child.272 The best interest of the child tests are meant to balance the
potential harm to a child if he or she stays in an unsafe environment
with his or her parent against the potential harm of separating the
child from his or her parent.273 When maltreatment is suspected,
many forms of intervention are possible.274 The courts are not nec-
essarily involved at every stage of the inquiry, but if they do get in-
volved, they are likely to rely heavily on the best interests of the child
test to determine where the child should be placed.275
As states began to look more closely at families where abuse or
neglect may have been occurring, they determined a need for a system
by which to evaluate whether intervention was necessary, and, if so,
how much.276 Courts and legislatures began constructing tests to help
assess the health of the parent-child relationship.277 These tests can
take into account almost anything about the relationship between the
parent and child, the relationship between the child and any other
potential caretaker, the mental and physical health of the parties,
269. BUDD ET AL., supra note 193, at 19.
270. Id. at 7.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 17.
273. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 6, at 2.
274. BUDD ET AL., supra note 193, at 18–19.
275. See id. In some circumstances, a state may intervene in a parent-child relation-
ship without a court order if the maltreatment is not severe, such as over-discipline or leav-
ing a school-age child unattended. Id. at 18.
276. See id. at 20–22.
277. See id. at 20–21 tbl. 1.2. Michigan was an early state to adopt a model for deter-
mining what was in a child’s best interests. Id. at 21 tbl. 1.2. The model defined the “best
interests of the child” using the totality of the factors listed and required a court to con-
sider, evaluate, and determine such factors as the love and affection between the parties
involved, the permanence of the proposed family unit, the moral fitness of those involved,
the capacity of the parties involved to provide food, clothing, and other material needs to
the child, and more. Id.
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the permanence of a potential living situation, and more.278 The best
interests of the child test factors are helpful reminders meant to dis-
till the logical factors that most laypersons would rely upon to make
such an important decision in the lives of children and their parents.
They are meant to be comprehensive and balanced, not punitive or
skewed toward a particular result.
2. Do Not Account for Age Positively or Negatively
There is quite a bit of variation on the precise factors states
include in the best interests of the child tests, but the factors that
all states include are clearly intended to protect children and assist
courts in evaluating the health of a particular family.279 Many states
give discretion to courts as they weigh the factors by not requiring
every factor to be considered or by including a more broad, catch-all
factor that allows the court to take into account any other important
considerations.280 No state mentions, positively or negatively, the age
of the parent.281 Of course, some factors could cause a court to consider
the age of the parent. For example, the mental and emotional health
of the parent or a catch-all provision, if there is one, may require an
inquiry into the parent’s age. No state, however, includes a factor that
would give the court reason to pause and consider, if an adolescent
parent is involved, that the need for intervention may be the result of
factors outside of the parent’s control and rooted in the fact of his or
her adolescence, perhaps making drastic intervention unnecessary.
C. Tests Should Include a Factor That Seeks to Support Adolescent
Parents and Maintain Parent-Child Relationship
States should add a factor to their best interests of the child tests
that serves as a helpful warning to juvenile or family court judges that
there is a high potential for misunderstanding and misapplication of
the law when considering a dependency hearing involving adolescent
parents. Adolescent parents may not be sophisticated enough to advo-
cate effectively for themselves or their children once they enter the
dependency process because of legal and logistical challenges that
their youth creates. That inability may lead a judge to operate on
faulty assumptions about the adolescent’s abilities to parent, to seek
and receive support for his or her parenting, or to learn the skills nec-
essary to provide a nurturing environment and a stable home for his
278. Id.
279. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 6, at 2–3 (discussing the best
interest factors used by each state).
280. See id. at 4.
281. See id. at 3.
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or her child. The factor should be written from a positive perspective,
focusing on the concepts of support and training, and not from a puni-
tive stance. Of course, the factor is not intended to take the focus away
from protecting the child of the adolescent parent from harm. Rather,
it should be understood as a reminder to judges of the unique circum-
stances experienced by many adolescent parents and the possibility
that positive intervention and support could foster and maintain a
strong parent-child relationship.
Adolescent parents whose parenting is in question by the State
might find themselves in that situation for reasons outside of their
control or because they have made mistakes that could have been
avoided if they had had training and support.282 Because of the legal
roadblocks many adolescent parents encounter when they try to par-
ent their children, such as limitations on their ability to contract and
additional scrutiny of their parenting skills, adolescent parents can
be hamstrung by their youth even before their children are born.283
Adolescent parents, by the nature of their youth, are also likely to be
unprepared for parenting.284 They often are not financially stable, may
lack maturity required to parent, and have educational obligations
that are difficult to fulfill while bearing responsibility for a child.285
But with thoughtful support, they also may be more capable of learn-
ing how to become good parents than many parents whose parenting
skills have been called into question by the State.
Parents in every demographic can benefit from the support of
their family members, friends, and community in their efforts to raise
children. Adolescent parents have the responsibilities of parenthood
and the responsibilities of youth, which are often at odds. All parents
must attend to their children’s physical, mental, educational, and
moral growth, which requires parents to be economically stable, moti-
vated to provide their child with an education, emotionally mature,
and so much more. In addition, adolescent parents have responsi-
bilities to themselves to go to school, to grow and mature in their
relationships and social interactions, and to develop skills to become
independent from their families. Balancing the interests of a parent’s
responsibilities to his or her child and to himself or herself is often
difficult for an adult and presumably is even more so for an adolescent
282. See WENDY C. WOLF & SALLY LEIDERMAN, CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV.,
INVESTING IN “YOUNG FAMILIES:” SOME THOUGHTS ON ADVANTAGES, DISADVANTAGES AND
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS 2 (2001), available at http://www.capd.org/pubfiles/pub-2001-03-02
.pdf (arguing that “new options” are needed to help strengthen families with adolescent
parents because of the unique challenges they face).
283. See supra Part II.B.
284. See Katz, supra note 42, at 537 (describing the plight of young adolescents who are
expected to be competent and responsible parents).
285. See supra Part II.A.
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parent. Even the most mature, economically supported, and respon-
sible adolescent parents may find balancing their responsibilities
difficult to nearly impossible.
Adolescent parents may not be old enough to drive themselves to
work or school, and may not be able to get a job or attend school be-
cause they do not have reliable and affordable childcare.286 The Center
for Assessment and Policy Development released several policy papers
and analyses regarding the kind of support that could help strengthen
the extremely at-risk families headed by adolescents in the late 1990s
and early 2000s.287 Specifically, supporting adolescent parents as they
attempt to maintain their education while juggling their parenting
responsibilities requires reliance on several important areas: child
care for their young children, prenatal care, health care for their young
children, transportation help, and more.288 More generally, adolescent
parents often need help with life and parenting skills, housing assis-
tance, economic assistance, and counseling in any number of areas,
including substance abuse and domestic violence intervention.289
The difficulty associated with providing these services to adolescent
parents is not necessarily that the services do not exist, but that it is
often difficult to identify those in need of the services and convince
them to seek the services.290
286. CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., PROVIDING CRITICAL SERVICES AND SUPPORTS
TO TEEN PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (1999), available at http://www.capd.org/pubfiles
/pub-1999-10-04.pdf (emphasizing the many difficulties teenage parents face in succeeding
in school without the necessary support systems in place).
287. See, e.g., CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., HELPING THE EDUCATION SYSTEM
WORK FOR TEEN PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (1999), available at http://www.capd
.org/pubfiles/pub-1999-10-06.pdf (giving recommendations for providing access to educa-
tional benefits for adolescent parents); CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., supra note
286 (noting that adolescent parents need support services to stay in school); CTR. FOR
ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., SCHOOL-BASED PROGRAMS FOR ADOLESCENT PARENTS AND
THEIR YOUNG CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW (1997), available at http://www.capd.org/pubfiles
/pub-1997-10-01.pdf (discussing strategies to help adolescent parents overcome barriers);
CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., SUPPORTING YOUNG FAMILIES: CHALLENGES TO
IMPLEMENTING CONTEMPORARY WELFARE POLICY (1999), available at http://www.capd.org
/pubfiles/pub-1999-10-02.pdf (advocating supportive school environments); S. A. STEPHENS
ET AL., CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., IMPROVING OUTCOMES FOR TEEN PARENTS
AND THEIR YOUNG CHILDREN BY STRENGTHENING SCHOOL-BASED PROGRAMS: CHALLENGES,
SOLUTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1999), available at http://www.capd.org/pubfiles
/pub-1999-04-01.pdf (providing solutions for strengthening school efforts to assist ado-
lescent parents); WOLF & LEIDERMAN, supra note 282, at 2 (suggesting policy reasons to
strengthen young families).
288. CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., supra note 286 (listing various support ser-
vices that should be provided for teen parents and their children).
289. Id.
290. Id. (“[I ]t often takes special efforts to deal with the concerns of teen parents for
their own independence and authority over decisions affecting themselves and their chil-
dren, while providing them with appropriate information and guidance in making appro-
priate decisions.”).
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Ironically, the problems that adolescent parents often encounter
are quite solvable, and, depending on the community and the need,
the solutions are not particularly difficult to provide. According to the
Center for Assessment and Policy Development, some of the biggest
challenges to communities that seek to provide support and services
to adolescent parents are the difficulties associated with linking ap-
propriate community-based services with schools, dealing with the
capacity limitations of community services providers, and overcoming
the reluctance of some adolescent parents to utilize support services.291
It may be somewhat counterintuitive, but schools are not necessarily
good places to provide services that are not perceived to be directly
related to educational goals, such as childcare, even though those ser-
vices are crucial to adolescent parents’ ability to continue with their
schooling.292 Also, many of the support services available in communi-
ties are not particularly suited to adolescent parents because they are
not specially designed to support adolescents.293 Lastly, adolescent par-
ents often struggle with maintaining their independence as parents
and are loath to accept services that make them feel less autonomous
in their parenting.294
It is an understatement to say that the notion of a state taking
an active role in supporting adolescent parents is novel. States and
the federal government have been extremely hesitant to appear to be
targeting adolescent parents for support in any way.295 This is incred-
ibly ironic, however, with the staggering number of statistics that
indicate that being an adolescent parent is even more difficult than
being an adult parent.296 Instead of continuing to try and solve the
problems associated with adolescent parenting by throwing money at
preventing teen pregnancy, states and the federal government should
take an active role in supporting and training adolescent parents to
help them raise healthy, educated, productive children.
The confluence of the psychological, mental, societal, and legal
difficulties an adolescent parent will likely encounter in his or her
youth are enough to cause even the most seasoned and supported
parent to falter. Expecting a young and likely immature adolescent
parent to navigate the difficulties of parenthood while juggling school,
work, and all other responsibilities normally reserved to adults is
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. Id. (“Even the processes required for accessing and using these services may assume
a level of maturity and independence that many teen parents do not yet have.”).
294. CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., supra note 286.
295. See Fershee, supra note 183, at 315–16 (“[T]he level of dedication, financial re-
sources, and passion reserved for stopping the social ill of teen pregnancy dies a sudden
death when a teen actually gets pregnant.”).
296. See supra Part II.A.
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unrealistic. Right now, states do nothing to alert judges to the reason-
able and understandable ways in which adolescent parents may stum-
ble, thereby leaving courts at risk of holding an adolescent parent’s
youth against him or her in the analysis of whether he or she should
maintain custody or parental rights. States can do more to create and
maintain healthy family structures by acknowledging that adoles-
cent parents who do find themselves under investigation for abuse or
neglect likely are simply ill-equipped to handle the complexities of
parenthood on their own. By taking a more affirmative and supportive
stance when determining the parental rights of an adolescent parent,
states can protect children and their parents from the lasting harm
that comes from a termination of parental rights or even a temporary
loss of custody by providing training, services, and resources to strug-
gling adolescent parents.
While even a modest amount of support and services sometimes
may do wonders for adolescent parents in their efforts to raise healthy,
educated, well-adjusted children, challenges abound when linking ap-
propriate services to the people who need them.297 As a result, adoles-
cent parents may find themselves at a higher risk for intervention
by child and family services investigations, which could have been
avoided with training, support, and a small amount of intervention.
Once an adolescent parent has entered the system, however, the
State has more power, authority, and access to ensure that the ado-
lescent parent receives the services and support he or she needs.298
Writing new factors into the best interest of the child tests requiring
a court or child and family services personnel to assess the challenges
that adolescence presents for parents in order to intervene positively
in that adolescent parent’s life could do more to help families stay
together than any other method of intervention.299 Although perhaps
not the most efficient path to preserving the familial bond between
adolescent parents and their children, a new best interests of the
child factor that contemplates the unique challenges of adolescent
parenthood could be the most effective way to keep children and their
parents together.
States should consider adding the following language to their
best interests of the child test:
Because parents under the age of eighteen do not have the same
legal rights as adults to participate fully in society, but do have
297. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 287 (highlighting the difficulties of identifying
at-risk teen parents and providing them with the necessary support services).
298. See CTR. FOR ASSESSMENT & POLICY DEV., supra note 286 (describing the reluctance
of some teenage parents to take advantage of the support services that are available).
299. See id. (suggesting several possible support services that might be provided to
teen parents and their children).
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the same legal responsibilities as all parents, the court should con-
sider whether increased supervision and support would be more
appropriate than removal of custody, depending on the particular
circumstances presented in each case.
This language would allow the court flexibility to remove from an ado-
lescent parent’s custody any child whose welfare is in clear and pres-
ent danger, but would also serve as a helpful reminder that adolescent
parents may simply need increased training, supervision, support,
and/or services.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental right to parent is not legally conditioned.
Parents are presumed good parents until they act in a way that calls
into question their ability to provide a safe, healthy, loving, and nur-
turing environment to their children. There are groups of parents,
however, who might, for a variety of reasons often outside of their
control, have more difficulty providing that safe and nurturing envi-
ronment for children. Adolescent parents, as discussed above, are in
a demographic that tends to struggle with the responsibilities asso-
ciated with parenthood, and they have fewer legal rights than their
adult counterparts. Even though there are multiple indicators that
many adolescent parents have significant limitations as parents, the
law does essentially nothing to support and encourage them in their
parenting roles.
States should, in every circumstance, be loath to disrupt the
parent-child relationship when its intervention is improper, immoral,
or unfair. Adolescent parents are no more deserving of that deference
than any other parent. The likelihood, however, that adolescent par-
ents will be judged harshly for something they cannot control—their
adolescence—and be at risk for losing their parental rights because
of it makes clear that courts should proceed with caution and care
when considering the parental rights of an adolescent parent. Consid-
ering the data showing that children of adolescent parents are at risk
for negative life outcomes and considering the utter impossibility of
eradicating teen pregnancy and parenting, it seems entirely reason-
able that the next logical step to improve the lives of at-risk children
is to support their parents. After all, to rephrase Dr. Seuss, a parent
is a parent, no matter how small.300
300. See DR. SEUSS, HORTON HEARS A WHO! (1954).
